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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
In the early morning hours of December 8, 1982, fifteen suspected dissidents were 
taken from their homes in Suriname’s capital, Paramaribo.  By nearly all accounts, they 
were tortured and killed by their military captors just a few hours later.  Within two days, 
the Netherlands, Suriname’s key economic aid provider, severed its aid program in 
response to this case of human rights abuse.  Aid was resumed in the late 1980s following 
democratic reforms (Gillies 1996).   Why did the Dutch respond to the extrajudicial 
killings of 15 Surinamese with the immediate suspension of economic assistance?  How 
did their reaction in this case compare to its response to other instances of violations?  
How does the Dutch reaction compare to other major donor countries’ behavior in the 
face of serious human rights abuses?  These questions form the basis of this dissertation 
research.   
In the sections that follow, I will detail the research question that I address in this 
dissertation.  I will then provide a brief outline of the remaining chapters of this 
dissertation. 
1.1 The Puzzle 
Many traditional definitions of the state – e.g. Westphalian, Weberian, Hobbesian 
– view the government as king; by and large, traditional notions of sovereignty allow for 
government control over domestic population, permitting the use of force if necessary 
(c.f. Henkin 1979).  External criticisms of domestic issues are illegitimate.  States often 
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view any attempts to change a country’s internal affairs through coercion or imposition as 
violations of Westphalian sovereignty (Krasner 1999).  
Yet, despite the strongly held norm of non-interference, claims about atrocities 
abroad have motivated states’ foreign policy for centuries.  In the 19th century, Britain 
used foreign policy tools in its fight to abolish the slave trade (Krasner 1999; Kaufman 
and Pape 1999). Since World War Two, a large body of international human rights law 
has come into existence.  Through a variety of human rights agreements, states have 
committed themselves to respecting the human rights of their own citizens.  Over the 
same time period, it has become increasingly commonplace for states to consider the 
human rights records of other states in foreign policy decisions, such as official 
development aid (ODA), or to publicly criticize other states’ human rights records.  In 
1968, Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden forced Greece to resign from the 
Council of Europe following violations of the European Convention’s human rights 
provisions at the hands of the Greek’s military government (Sikkink 1993b).  In the mid-
1980s, Norway used a package of positive incentives to pressure Sri Lanka to change its 
human rights practices (Egeland 1984).  In 1977, the United States government used 
section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to suspend military aid to a number 
of South American countries in response to human rights violations in these countries 
(c.f. Sikkink 1993b).  States also use economic sanctions to pressure human rights 
violators to improve conditions.  Of the 186 economic sanctions analyzed in their book, 
Hufbauer et al. classify the goals of over 50 of them as improving human rights 
(Hufbauer et al. 2007).  
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States have many foreign policy tools at their disposal with which to criticize and 
pressure human rights violators.  These tools range from relatively costless, and therefore 
more common, diplomatic condemnation to extremely rare and costly military 
intervention.  Most existing empirical work, which I will discuss in Chapter 2, focuses on 
the intermediate policy options, such as restrictions on military and economic aid.  As 
Gillies (1996) points out, even within this class of policy tools, there is a wide range of 
assertiveness: from cutting aid entirely to withholding only new aid to simply placing 
vague conditions on aid.  Although these policies may not directly contradict 
Westphalian notions of sovereignty, they are tools with which states attempt to change 
the internal politics of other states. 
There are also numerous examples of states failing to respond to violations in 
other states.  American support for Latin American dictators irrespective of their 
numerous human rights violations and the international inaction during the Rwandan 
genocide in the 1990s provide just two examples of states failing to respond to human 
rights atrocities abroad.  More recently, human rights advocates criticize the strong 
United States relationship with an oppressive Chinese regime, one that they say is not 
doing enough to prevent human rights atrocities in the Darfur region of Sudan.  
Especially interesting to note is that some of the same states that do attempt to punish 
violators, as in the above examples, often do nothing in the face of severe violations.  It 
is, therefore, not simply characteristics of particular states that predispose them to 
pressuring violators.   
In light of this, I ask: when, and why, will states take action to criticize and punish 
human rights violators?   In this dissertation, I will focus on direct government-to-
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government official development assistance will ask, more specifically, under what 
conditions do donors withhold or limit aid to recipients who violate the human rights of 
their citizens?    
1.2 Outline of Dissertation 
  
 This dissertation proceeds as follows.  In Chapter 2, I will review the existing 
theoretical and empirical understandings of the role of human rights in foreign policy.  
Although many scholars have tackled the question of how the promotion of human rights 
fits in foreign policy goals, the existing literature is mainly mixed on whether human 
rights influences foreign aid decision-making.  In addition, I find that comprehensive, 
large-N comparative studies of human rights and foreign aid are rare.  Those that do exist 
largely neglect the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or fail to develop a 
theoretically-compelling causal story for how NGOs influence foreign aid policy-making.   
In Chapter 3, I will detail my explanation, beginning with a discussion of foreign 
aid decision making in general and moving on to place human rights in the broader 
context of foreign policy goals.  My explanation centers around the opportunity costs of 
using foreign aid to promote human rights, in terms of policy aims not pursued.  I argue 
that a low opportunity cost is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for policymakers to 
punish human rights violators.  Not only must the cost be low, but the leaders must 
perceive some benefit to acting.  The activities of NGOs provide an incentive for leaders 
to act, but only when costs are low.  I also argue, in contrast to the existing literature, that 
the effect of human rights on foreign aid is largely mediated through NGO mobilization.  
That is to say that donors respond to violations that are publicized, rather than simply to 
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the violations themselves.  I also explore the role of donor political institutions in shaping 
how susceptible leaders are to NGO pressure to punish human rights violators. 
In Chapter 4, I provide the variables, methods, and models I use to test my 
hypotheses.  One contribution of this dissertation is that I am testing my hypotheses using 
a comprehensive dataset, covering all OECD donors and all recipients from the years 
1980-2000.  Most of the existing literature (Neumayer 2003 is the exception) focuses on 
a handful of countries, either using qualitative or quantitative analyses.1  In Chapter 4, I 
discuss the methodological challenges in dealing with this dataset, namely issues of non-
independence.  In addition, I develop a test for the NGO mediation explanation, 
examining if the effect of human rights is mediated through NGO mobilization.   
I present my results in two chapters.  First, in Chapter 5, I explore donors’ 
decisions to give aid at the gate-keeping stage.  The empirical focus of this chapter is to 
ask whether donors withhold aid to human rights violators, conditional on characteristics 
of the donor-recipient relationship and donor political institutions.  Briefly, I find support 
for my argument that non-governmental organizations mediate the effect of human rights 
on foreign aid.  In addition, I find that whether NGO mobilization affects aid 
disbursement depends on how the donor values the relationship with the recipient.  If the 
recipient is geographically close to the donor or is a former colony, then the donor is less 
likely to withhold aid even if the recipient’s human rights record has drawn the attention 
of NGOs.  I also find that donors are not more likely to react to NGO pressure as the 
donor’s electoral permissiveness increases. 
                                                
1 Barratt (2008) also does a large-N quantitative test, but she uses a pooled-sample where the observation is 
recipient-year, with aid from all donors pooled.  She cannot, therefore, test donor-specific characteristics. 
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In Chapter 6, I consider the second stage of foreign aid decision-making, the 
allocation stage.  This chapter focuses on the question of how much aid donors give to 
recipients and whether human rights violators receive less aid, all else equal.  I find 
additional support for my hypothesis that the effect of human rights on foreign aid - in 
this case the share of aid a recipient receives - is filtered through the publicizing role of 
NGOs.  I also find that the effect of NGO mobilization on the share of aid depends on 
context.  Donors give less aid to recipients who are subject to NGO pressure, but only if 
the recipient is not an important strategic partner, not a significant petroleum exporter, or 
if the recipient is geographically distant.  
Finally, in chapter 7, I will offer conclusions, as well as a discussion of the 
implications of my findings and next steps for future research.  I explore ideas for future 
research to address some of the weak or anomalous findings.  I also address some of the 
broader implications of my theory and findings.   
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Chapter 2  
Human Rights in Foreign Policy 
 
Historically, human rights - and moral issues in general - did not draw much 
attention in foreign policy and international relations literature.  Traditional realist 
scholars argued that it was inappropriate for states to consider moral issues in foreign 
policy (Kennan 1985; Morgenthau 1979).  Further, pursuing a moral foreign policy 
would likely come to the detriment of state interests, traditionally defined in security and 
material terms (c.f. Morgenthau 1979).  In addition, entrenched norms of state 
sovereignty dictated that leaders had internal autonomy, permitting the use of force 
within borders if necessary.  As legal scholar Brierly puts it: "no rule [prior to 1945] was 
clearer than that a state's treatment of its own nationals is a matter exclusively within the 
domestic jurisdiction of that state, is not controlled or regulated by international law” 
(quoted in Kamminga 1992, 1).  States jealously guarded their internal autonomy and 
deemed any criticism of domestic policy and conditions to be illegitimate.  For example, 
in response to international criticism regarding its treatment of the Armenian people, the 
Turkish government repeatedly declared the matter part of internal politics and called any 
intercessions inappropriate (c.f. Kamminga 1992).  
Although there are some notable pre-World War II exceptions such as the 
abolition of slavery, it was not until after World War II that human rights took a more 
prominent role in international relations and international institutions.  Articles 1, 55 and 
56 of the United Nations Charter forms the foundation for the international human rights 
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regime that emerged following World War II.  Article 1 states that the United Nations 
shall encourage “respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms” (United 
Nations 1995, 143).  The Charter also calls for “universal respect for, and observance of, 
human rights” in Article 55 (United Nations 1995, 144). Article 56 lays out the duties of 
member states “to promote international cooperation, including cooperation in the human 
rights field” (United Nations 1995, 7).  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a 
legally non-binding declaration, soon followed and enumerated what the drafters saw as 
universal rights.  In addition, there are seven core UN human rights agreements, each 
focusing on a different set of rights, and several additional agreements covering various 
liberties.  
Despite the inclusion of human rights rhetoric in important international 
documents, this did not immediately translate into strong enforcement of human rights 
norms globally.  As a result of lobbying by the United States and United Kingdom, the 
UN documents were largely aspirational in nature.  Donnelly (1986) concludes that the 
international human rights regime is largely declaratory or promotional, rather than 
containing strong enforcement mechanisms.  The U.S. and U.K., despite advocating for 
human rights in the Atlantic Charter, were concerned about the implications of binding 
legal standards.  The southern Democrats in the US Senate provided the oppositional 
voice in the United States, while the British had imperial interests to protect (c.f. 
Simmons 2009).2  The UN Charter, although highlighting the importance of human rights 
in its preamble and Article 55, also enshrines the doctrine of non-intervention in Article 
2(7).  Although states were urged to protect the rights of their citizens, these agreements 
                                                
2 A strong force against ratifying the core UN human rights treaties in the United States was the Bricker 
Amendment, which limited presidential authority with respect to treaties in an effort to protect states’ rights 
(c.f. Forysthe 1990; Sikkink 1993b).   
 
 9 
were essentially “toothless,” lacking any enforcement mechanisms of their own, 
especially with the UN Charter explicitly not authorizing intervention in domestic affairs.  
2.1 Enforcement of Human Rights Norms 
Scholars recognize the enforcement of international human rights law as 
particularly problematic compared to other areas of international law (c.f. Simmons 2009; 
Moravcsik 2000; Hafner-Burton 2009). Issue areas like trade and arms control, for 
example, can depend on reciprocity as a tool for enforcement.  Because the potential for 
mutual gains from cooperation exists, treaties in these issue areas- such as the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Basic Principles Agreement between the United 
States and USSR (Keohane 1986) - are essentially self-enforcing.  If one state defects in 
pursuit of a short-term gain, another state can defect as a punishment strategy.  
Cooperation occurs then, because the long-term costs of punishment outweigh the short-
term gains from cheating (Keohane 1984). This strategy does not typically fit with human 
rights for two main reasons.  First, there is not a clear mutual gain to be had from 
pursuing human rights norms.  In other words, it is not clear how, for example, Sweden 
benefits from Canada protecting the human rights of its citizens.  Second, the strategy of 
reciprocity does not apply to human rights treaties.  If one country does not comply with 
the provisions of a human rights treaty, another state cannot logically punish it by 
violating the rights of its own citizens.  Actors wishing to enforce human rights 
compliance are left to find other strategies.  In her book, Simmons (2009) argues that the 
main path to enforcement of human rights treaties is through the empowerment of 
domestic actors and institutions. She further argues that collective action problems, as 
well as a lack of incentives to incur costs to enforce human rights norms, mean that 
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international enforcement, or “peer accountability,” is likely to be both weak and 
underprovided.   
Regardless of the empirical accuracy of Simmons’ assertion that international 
enforcement is unlikely, there is evidence that states at least sometimes do attempt to 
punish human rights violators and this remains a puzzle.  The existing literature on 
foreign policy and human rights highlights the various foreign policy tools that states can 
use to encourage other states to protect the human rights of their citizens.  These tools can 
be used either as “carrots,” to reward states that protect human rights, or “sticks,” to 
punish states that violate the human rights of their citizens.  Foreign policy tools range 
from diplomatic to economic to military. At one end of the spectrum, states can use 
diplomatic condemnation to express their disapproval of another state’s human rights 
records (see Kamminga (1992) for both historical and contemporary examples of 
diplomatic intercessions).  States also use international organizations as forums for 
condemning human rights records.  For example, states use the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights to “name and shame” human rights violators (Lebovic and 
Voeten 2006). Since the early 2000s, preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have been 
used to promote human rights norms by making trade conditional on human rights 
conditions (Hafner-Burton 2004; Hafner-Burton 2009). States have also used economic 
sanctions to punish human rights violators.  Of the 186 cases of economic sanctions they 
analyze in their book, Hufbuaer et al. classify 50 of them as motivated, at least in part, by 
human rights (Hufbauer et al. 2007).  Just to name a few examples, the United States and 
the United Kingdom sanctioned Uganda in the 1970s as a result of Idi Amin’s repressive 
policies.  Beginning in 1976, the United States used sanctions to coerce Uruguay to 
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improve its human rights conditions.  Finally, at the extreme of the spectrum of policy 
options, are military interventions.  Military action in response to human rights violations 
is rare and typically conflated with geopolitical and other explanations for conflict.  For 
example, politicians framed the interventions in Iraq, Somalia and Kosovo in 
humanitarian terms (c.f. Henkin 1999; Pease and Forsythe 1993), regardless of other 
motivations for these conflicts.  
This begs two questions: first, why would states want to influence the domestic 
human rights policies of other countries? Second, do states actually use foreign policy 
tools to enforce human rights norms?  For the most part, scholars tend to focus on the 
latter question.  In particular, there is much empirical literature looking at the relationship 
between foreign aid and human rights.  Other foreign policy tools are not as well studied.  
From a theoretical perspective, on the other hand, answers to the former question are less 
common and, often, incomplete.  
2.2 Theoretical Foundations for Human Rights Foreign Policy 
International relations scholars have long debated the appropriate role of morality 
and human rights in foreign policy.  Scholars of the realist tradition typically take the 
view that human rights do not belong in foreign policy.  Morgenthau (c.f. 1951; 1978; 
1979) makes the claim that moral principles cannot be imposed on other states and that, 
to the extent that moral considerations are part of foreign policy, that they are subordinate 
to power politics.  Because the primary role of the state - from the realist perspective - is 
to preserve its continued existence, foreign policy necessarily must focus on national 
security and power, rather than moral issues (Kennan 1985). Further, because a state’s 
respect of its citizens’ human rights “provides little or no direct benefit to other states,” 
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realists would not expect states to take any costly action to encourage compliance in other 
states (Hathaway 2002; 1946).   
Yet, we do observe cases of states reacting to human rights violations in other 
states and taking costly action to encourage improved conditions.  The realist approach 
suggests two reasons why we might observe states taking action to incorporate morality 
into foreign policy, including the promotion of human rights abroad. First, these efforts 
are “cheap talk” and states use this rhetoric to legitimize traditional realist behavior, such 
as pursuing other geopolitical interests (Hathaway 2002, 1946).  This explanation is 
derived from the realist belief that power and security drive foreign policy (c.f. Carr 
1946; Morgenthau 1966).  Second, human rights regimes and subsequent pressures to 
comply may reflect some powerful states’ genuine commitment to human rights, as these 
powerful states attempt to impose their beliefs on others (Waltz 1979).  Krasner (1999), 
for example, highlights how stronger states used coercion to impose respect for minority 
rights, such as for Christians in the Ottoman Empire.  However, this second point begs 
the question: why are these states committed to human rights and why would they decide 
to use their power to impose their normative preferences – in favor of human rights – on 
other states?   
Although realists are skeptical about the appropriate role of human rights in 
foreign policy, other scholars recognize that states do sometimes make genuine attempts 
to improve human rights in other states. In her work on preferential trade agreements, 
Hafner-Burton (2004) argues that states select human rights institutions to solve the 
cooperation problem they face.  States that seek to influence other states’ human rights 
behaviors – she names “influencers” – represent one of four reasons for including human 
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rights standards in PTAs.3  She argues that rich, democratic states are most likely to have 
the “economic resources, political will, and the bargaining authority” to be influencers 
(Hafner-Burton 2004, 17).  Further, she argues that these states will use non-reciprocal 
PTAs with hard human rights standards to impose human rights obligations on recipient 
states (Hafner-Burton 2004).  Although Hafner-Burton considers how “influencers” 
operate - through PTAs - she does not delve into why these states would choose to do so.  
In other words, what is it that motivates these rich, democratic states to tie trade terms to 
human rights?  In the follow-up book, Hafner-Burton (2009) argues that states 
incorporate human rights conditions into PTAs for “political gain, by paying rents to 
bootleggers or solving other political problems, regardless of their own moral conviction 
on the issue, and they often use moral language to justify their views” (82). 
In a detailed comparison of European and American human rights policies, 
Sikkink identifies the United States, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden as 
countries that explicitly integrate human rights into foreign policy calculations (Sikkink, 
1993b).  Sikkink explains the adoption of these policies using the concept of “principled 
ideas” in changing foreign policy-making calculus.  Sikkink argues that the atrocities 
committed during World War II led the Western European countries to develop ethically 
sound foreign policies. Sikkink (1993b) argues that, in the United States, anti-
communism, isolationism, and segregationist sentiment postponed the adoption of a 
strong human rights foreign policy until 1973.  In the early 1970s, American elite public 
opinion changed as a result of a series of events (e.g. Watergate, Vietnam, Civil Rights 
                                                
3 Hafner-Burton (2004) identifies three other reasons for using PTAs: “to gain legitimacy at home or 
abroad (legitimizers), to secure economic benefits (conceders), to make credible domestic polity 




movement), leading to the institutionalization of human rights concerns in foreign policy 
(Sikkink 1993b).   
This elite-driven, “principled ideas” approach, however, does not explain the 
variation in human rights foreign policy. Sikkink’s explanation, with the exception of her 
description of US policy, does not account for changes over time.  Sikkink recognizes the 
importance of Cold War politics for the US as superpower and argues that the US did not 
truly develop an external human rights policy until the period of détente (Sikkink 1993b). 
However, with respect to the Western European countries, she claims that “the Western 
Europeans have held fast to the human rights regime” (Sikkink 1993b, 166).  Yet, of the 
Western European states that Sikkink identifies as developing external human rights 
policies - Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden - there are numerous cases 
where these states turn a blind eye to violations. Although, for example, the Netherlands 
responded strongly to human rights violations in its former colony of Suriname in 1982 
following the killing of fifteen civilians who opposed the current government, it did not 
do the same when Indonesia, another former colony, repeatedly violated the rights of the 
East Timorese (c.f. Gillies 1996).  
2.3 The Empirical Record 
 
Empirically, skeptics point to the inconsistent application of U.S. foreign aid 
requirements – such as Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 – as evidence 
that human rights cannot trump security and economic concerns.  The policies of the 
United States and its application of laws such as Section 502B have been subject to a 
number of empirical studies, with mixed results.  Many scholars do find results consistent 
with the realist critique: that economic and military aid patterns are, at best, unrelated to 
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the human rights record of receiving states and, at worst, positively correlated with 
human rights violations (Stohl, Carleton and Johnson, 1984; Regan 1995).  On the other 
hand, others find that the United States has considered human rights in military and 
economic aid decisions (c.f. Poe 1992); Although they do not find that the United States 
put human rights above all other considerations, Apodaca and Stohl (1999)– using the 
most comprehensive dataset to date – do find that the human rights records of potential 
recipients impact both the decision to give aid and the level of aid given for the Reagan 
and Bush administrations, but not the Clinton and Carter administrations.  Much of the 
disagreement between the two camps studying US foreign aid and human rights lies in 
specification issues.  In particular, there is disagreement over which recipients to include 
or exclude for various reasons, as well as how best to measure human rights.4 
 Only looking at United States’ foreign policy ignores the actions of other initiator 
states.  As the world’s sole superpower, the United States is in a unique position.  Other 
states, living under the security umbrella provided by the hegemon, may have more 
freedom to pursue other foreign policy goals, such as the advancement of human rights.  
In some of the few quantitative, comparative pieces, Neumayer (2003) considers the 
relationship between foreign aid and human rights for OECD donors. He finds that some 
                                                
4 For example, Cingranelli & Pasquarello (1985) find a positive relationship between US foreign aid and 
human rights conditions in Latin American recipients in the 1980s, but other scholars raise concerns about 
their human rights measure and case selection.  Upon reanalysis, both Carleton & Stohl (1986) and 
Mitchell & McCormick (1988) find that Cingranelli & Pasquarello (1985) results are not robust. El 
Salvador is a particularly challenging case due to its strategic importance to the US during the 1980s and 
results vary substantially with its inclusion (c.f. Poe et al. 1994).  Mitchell & McCormick (1988) find that 
including El Salvador results in a negative, but insignificant, relationship between human rights and US 
economic and military aid.   Carleton & Stohl (1986) argue that the logic leading one to exclude El 
Salvador - that it was a “nonroutine” case for the US - should also lead to the exclusion of Nicaragua, 
Honduras, and Jamaica.  These scholars also raise concerns with Cingranelli & Pasquarello’s reliance on 
State Department reports for their measure of human rights, citing political bias.  In their reanalysis, they 
find both of these decisions - to exclude El Salvador and to use the State Department human rights measure 
- are critical to the statistically significant results Cingranelli & Pasquarello find.  Lifting either of these 
controversial assumptions results in insignificant results (Carleton & Stohl 1986). 
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types of human rights matter at some times, but that there is no consistent pattern.  In 
particular, he finds that civil and political rights matter at the gate-keeping stage for most 
donors, while personal integrity rights only matter for a few donors at this stage.5  While 
at the aid allocation stage a few donors seem to respond to good human rights records by 
allocating more aid, many allocate more aid to countries that do not respect these rights.  
What is especially interesting about Neumayer’s findings is that the so-called “like-
minded states” - Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden - do not exhibit 
any consistent concern for human rights in their aid decision-making, contrary to 
expectations and rhetoric from these countries.6  What is missing from his explanation is 
a theoretical expectation of why some donors sometimes take human rights into 
consideration in foreign aid decisions.  
In a series of comparative case studies, Gillies (1996) tests the hypothesis that states 
only act assertively in response to human rights violations when the costs of doing so are 
perceived to be low relative to other national interests. Gillies (1996) selects three 
“internationalist” states – Canada, the Netherlands, and Norway – precisely because these 
cases provide a “hard test” for the realist proposition.  He argues that if any states will 
promote human rights through foreign policy, we would expect states that maintain a 
strong tradition of internationalism and leadership on moral issues to lead the pack 
(Gillies 1996, 13). Gillies argues that states are more likely to respond to violations with 
                                                
5 Neumayer (2003) finds that France, the United States, Denmark, and Australia are more likely to give aid 
to countries that respect personal integrity rights, while Sweden, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Portugal, 
Spain, and Switzerland are actually less likely to give aid to countries that respect these rights.   
6 Olsen (1998) and Gates & Hoeffler (2004), for example, predict that the Nordic countries will condition 
aid on human rights more so than other countries.  In their own analysis, Gates & Hoeffler (2004) find that 
of the Nordic countries, only Denmark gives less aid to violators.  From a theoretical point-of-view, 
Egeland (1984) asserts that “small states with less non-moral foreign policy interests in international 
conflict areas should conversely invest more resources in actively and directly trying to influence the 
human rights situation in the actual frontlines” (212). 
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assertive policy when (1) the violating state is not in a position to retaliate, (2) competing 
commercial or security interests are absent or minor, and (3) reaction would not pose a 
cost to other vital interests.  Gillies considers the reactions of Canada, the Netherlands, 
and Norway to a series of cases of human rights violations. Gillies finds that, contrary to 
their publicly stated foreign policy goals, these states do not put human rights 
considerations above commercial interests in decisions about official development aid.  
Barratt (2008) similarly finds that human rights concerns do not trump economic and 
strategic concerns.  Due to data limitations, Barratt’s quantitative analysis employs 
pooled foreign aid data, limiting her ability to draw conclusions about donor 
characteristics outside of her three country cases.   
The empirical literature sets human rights considerations alongside other foreign 
policy goals, such as economic and security interests.  The absence of strong competing 
economic or security interests emerge as a necessary condition for the incorporation of 
human rights into foreign aid decisions.  Barratt (2008) and Gillies (1996) also briefly 
introduce the role of interest groups and non-governmental organizations.  The 
Norwegian response to human rights violations in Sri Lanka was driven, in part, by a 
vocal Tamil population in Norway (Gillies 1996; Egeland 1984).  Barratt (2008) briefly 
suggests that human rights groups can “increase the salience of human rights as a policy 
issue” (45).  The discussion of the casual mechanism - how do NGOs influence 
policymakers to use foreign aid to punish human rights violators - is largely 
underdeveloped.  As I discuss in the next chapter, these are important first steps in 
placing human rights into a broader framework of foreign policy.  What is still missing 
from this literature, however, is a comprehensive theory of how these factors interact and 
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how domestic institutions play a role in providing incentives for policymakers to pursue 
human rights-orientated foreign policy.  Finally, I will also contribute to the literature 
empirically by providing a new comparative quantitative examination of the relationship 
between human rights and foreign aid.      
 
 19 
Chapter 3  
Putting Human Rights in Context: Understanding the Role of Human Rights in 
Foreign Policy 
3.1 Introduction 
 In this dissertation, I ask under what conditions donors will punish human rights 
violators by withholding foreign aid or reducing the amount of aid given.7  Although 
previous literature has tackled this question, as discussed in Chapter 2, the findings are 
mixed.  Some scholars find that human rights matter for some donors (Neumayer 2003), 
for certain leaders (Apodaca and Stohl 1999), or when there are few commercial or 
strategic ties between the donor and recipient (Barratt 2008; Gillies 1996); others find 
that foreign aid and human rights are uncorrelated or that poor human rights records lead 
to more foreign aid (c.f. Stohl, Carleton and Johnson, 1984; Regan, 1995).  I argue that to 
understand why and when states react to human rights violations abroad, we must 
consider the domestic political context that policymakers in the donor country face, as 
well as the relationship between the donor and recipient. In brief, I argue that donors will 
be most likely to punish human rights violators who are the focus of NGO mobilization, 
but only if the donor does not seek valuable policy concessions from the recipient.  In 
addition, I examine how the donor’s political institutions influence its response to human 
rights violations.  I expect that institutional structures that favor national level public 
goods - namely, high district magnitude systems - will be more likely to respond to NGO 
pressure to punish violators. The decisions to use foreign policy tools to pursue a human 
                                                
7 More specifically, I focus on economic aid in the form of official development assistance. 
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rights agenda are part of a larger framework of foreign policy decisions.  Incorporating a 
broader understanding of foreign policy, and the domestic political context that informs 
foreign policy, will provide a more robust understanding of human rights foreign policy.  
Looking at human rights outside of this context ignores the relationship that human rights 
has with other foreign policy goals and produces an incomplete picture of human rights 
foreign policy.   
In the previous chapter, I highlighted the role of human rights in international 
politics and foreign policy in general.  In the sections that follow, I build from that 
discussion to develop a theory of human rights foreign policy that places its role among 
other foreign policy goals.  First, I explore the motivations for foreign aid in general, 
before introducing human rights as a possible foreign policy goal.  Then, I consider the 
relationship between the donor and recipient, as well as the domestic benefits the donor 
expect.  I argue that donors will carefully consider the costs of pursuing a human rights 
foreign policy.  In particular, donors need to consider whether the policy concessions the 
recipient has to offer the donor, in terms of its traditional foreign policy objectives of 
economic advancement and national security, are too valuable to sacrifice in the pursuit 
of a human rights-friendly foreign policy.  Once I outline the potential costs, I will 
explore the conditions under which policymakers in donor countries perceive a benefit to 
acting. Finally, I examine how donor political institutions structure the incentives for 
policymakers to punish human rights violators. 
3.2 Motivations for Foreign Aid 
 To explain the role that human rights plays in foreign aid decisions, we must first 
understand the political decision-making process behind bilateral aid decisions more 
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generally.  The perhaps naïve view of foreign aid is that donors target the most needy 
countries, with the goal of assisting economic development and eradicating poverty in the 
recipient country.  In fact, this is rarely the driving force behind aid decisions.8  Instead, 
aid decisions tend to center on the economic and strategic interests of the donor, rather 
than recipient need.   
 Donors use foreign aid, in part, to maintain good relationships with important 
trading and security partners.  Foreign aid may help open export markets to donor 
industry, maintain a sphere of influence, or help strengthen relationships with alliance 
partners (Barratt 2008).  Providing foreign aid to investment or trading partners helps 
promote growth in recipient countries, which in turn has positive externalities for the 
donor’s economic well-being (Maizels and Nissanke 1984).  Tied foreign aid has a more 
direct result on the donor’s economy, often requiring that the aid be used to purchase 
goods from the donor economy (Barratt 2008). 
 We can also identify domestic constituents who have an interest in foreign aid 
policy.  Milner and Tingley (2009) argue that, just as international trade policy creates 
winners and losers in the domestic economy, so does foreign aid policy. “Foreign 
economic aid, like trade, is one part of an internationalist foreign policy that seeks to 
maintain a stable, open world economy; hence, groups that benefit from such openness 
tend to support aid” (4).  Foreign aid is a transfer of capital from capital-rich to capital-
poor countries.  According to the Stolper-Samuelson and Heckscher-Ohlin theorems 
capital owners in donor countries should support foreign aid while unskilled labor should 
                                                
8 There are some minor exceptions in the current literature, for example the Nordic countries tend to give 
more to poorer recipients.  Literature on foreign aid in the 1970s often distinguished between “recipient 
need” and “donor interest” models and found little to no support for “recipient need” explanations for 
bilateral foreign aid (c.f. McKinlay and Little 1977).   
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oppose it (Milner and Tingley 2009).  Representatives of capital-rich districts should 
support foreign economic aid.  Looking at the United States House of Representatives 
from 1979 to 2003, Milner and Tingley (2009) find evidence to support this contention.   
 In addition to fostering economic ties, foreign aid can also strengthen strategic 
relationships between donors and recipients.  Donors may use foreign aid to solidify 
political and security alliances.  Foreign aid may entice recipients to provide donors with 
access to military bases, fly-over rights, and other privileges that assist the donor’s 
strategic agenda.  A classic example of using aid to secure security outcomes is U.S. aid 
to Israel & Egypt following the Camp David Accords.  In fact, nearly a third of US aid 
goes to Israel and Egypt (Alesina and Dollar 2000).   In the United States, there is a 
substantial constituency concerned with relationships with Israel and its neighbors and 
foreign aid is an important part of US foreign policy in the region.   Another example of 
using foreign aid for geopolitical objectives was Cold War policies in the United States 
and its allies to contain communism (Barratt 2008).   
 Donors also tend to foster strong aid relationships with former colonies.  For 
example, Portugal almost exclusively gives to former colonies and France and Japan also 
have strong preferences for their former colonies (Alesina and Dollar 2000).   Countries 
may feel a sense of moral obligation to former colonies and these strong historical ties 
often lead to significant foreign aid packages after independence (Gillies 1996).  Donors, 
acting with self-interest, may also use foreign aid to maintain their political influence in 
former colonies.   Alesina and Dollar (2000) find that former colonial status seems to 
matter more than level of democracy, finding that “a non-democratic former colony gets 
about twice as much aid as a democratic non-colony” (55).  
 
 23 
  Another approach to understanding foreign aid looks at aid as a means for donors 
to buy policy concessions from recipients (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009). If a 
recipient can provide some concession to the donor – such as fly-over rights, access to 
military bases, assistance with military operations, access to raw materials, access to 
markets for goods, UN votes, etc – then the donor may attempt to “buy” a policy 
concession using foreign aid.  In this model of foreign aid, money flows from donors 
with large winning coalitions who are seeking to provide a public good such as security 
or economic well-being to recipients with small winning coalitions who can easily be 
bought with foreign aid money (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009).   
 That donors give aid for policy concessions from recipients does not deviate too 
far from the more traditional explanations of foreign aid.  However, what Bueno de 
Mesquita and Smith do is explain why those policy concessions are important for the 
domestic politics of the donors themselves.  In other words, to say that donors seek policy 
concessions from recipients does not go far enough to say why donors buy these 
concessions.  What do decision-makers in the donor country gain from these 
concessions?  How do these concessions help a politician maintain office and win re-
election?  Using the Selectorate Model, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) explain that 
leaders of countries with large winning coalitions are more likely to buy policy 
concessions, because often these policy concessions take the form of a public good.  As 
the Selectorate Model predicts, leaders who answer to large winning coalitions must 
provide public goods to stay in office.  The strategic, political, or economic policy 
concessions that donors buy from recipients help the leaders of the donor country stay in 
power by providing a public good to the winning coalition.   
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 In the recipient country, leaders who answer to small winning coalitions are more 
likely to accept the aid in exchange for policy deal because they stay in power by 
providing private benefits to the small winning coalition.  The aid, in many cases, can be 
funneled into private benefits for the small winning coalition, thus keeping the leader in 
power despite making what may be unpopular policy concessions (Bueno de Mesquita 
and Smith 2009).   
 The Selectorate Model is not necessarily incompatible with the idea of other 
scholars that economic and strategic motivations drive foreign aid.  In fact, the 
Selectorate Theory approach provides an explanation of the domestic political factors that 
influence policymakers to use economic and strategic considerations in determining 
foreign aid.  Taken together, the Selectorate Theory suggests that donors will use aid to 
buy policy concessions that translate into public goods, while the traditional approach 
illustrates the nature of the policy concessions.   
3.3 Human Rights and Foreign Aid 
Where, then, do human rights fit in the explanations of foreign aid?  As argued 
above, foreign aid is meant to achieve certain foreign policy goals that are traditionally 
defined in economic and security terms.  The promotion of human rights is another goal 
that is often, but not always, in competition with these other foreign policy goals.  In the 
cases where using aid to promote human rights comes into conflict with security and/or 
economic goals, I expect human rights to be put aside in favor of pursuing these other 
goals.  However, human rights will most likely be incorporated into foreign aid decisions 
when the promotion of human rights complements other foreign policy goals.   
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 To ask, as some of the literature on human rights and foreign aid seems to, for 
human rights to trump other foreign policy goals is unrealistic.  The existing empirical 
findings that are mixed or conclude that human rights conditionality is applied 
inconsistently should not be surprising (c.f. Stohl, Carleton, & Johnson 1984; Regan 
1995; Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Neumayer 2003).  The context of violations will largely 
determine whether a donor decides to punish a recipient in response to a particular set of 
human rights violations.  In particular, the security and economic relationship between 
the donor and recipient, as well as the domestic political pressures decision-makers face, 
should matter.  As leaders face the decision whether to punish a recipient for violating 
human rights, they must weigh the consequences of such an action.  In many respects, the 
costs can be measured in terms of the other foreign policy interests the donor has with 
respect to the recipient.  For example, the United States would be unlikely to punish 
Egypt for human rights violations given the strong interest the U.S. has in regional 
security.  Similarly, many donors turn a blind eye to Chinese human rights violations as a 
result of China’s economic power.  On the other hand, Sweden’s economic and security 
well-being did not depend on its relationship with Sri Lanka, making punishing Sri Lanka 
a low-cost response to violations there (Gillies 1996).  All else equal, therefore, I expect 
donors to punish recipients with whom they have few economic or strategic ties.  The 
absence of these ties reduces the opportunity cost of punishing human rights violations.  
As I will discuss below, I believe this is a necessary but not sufficient condition.  There 
must also exist some domestic political pressure in the donor country to encourage 
policymakers to punish a violating recipient.   
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 In the sections that follow, I develop a more detailed discussion of the economic 
and security ties that I expect to matter.  I develop a series of interactive hypotheses that 
condition the role of human rights on foreign aid on the salience of economic and 
strategic relationship between the donor and recipient.  Following that, I outline an 
explanation of the source of benefits for decision-makers to condition foreign aid on 
human rights.  I argue that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provide information 
and pressure that gives leaders incentives to respond to human rights violations.  I 
introduce NGO activity as a mediating variable, through which I expect human rights to 
influence foreign aid.  In contrast to existing literature, I place less emphasis on the 
human rights conditions in the recipient country.  Instead, as I will argue below, the 
mediating factor for donors is the extent to which violations are publicized.  In the 
absence of publicity, I argue that policymakers in the donor countries are unlikely to 
perceive a political benefit to acting even in cases of severe violations.   
3.4 At What Cost? The Salience of Donor-Recipient Relations 
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) assert that leaders use foreign aid to buy 
policy concessions.  Further, they argue that the salience of these policy concessions is 
one key determinant of whether a donor provides aid to a potential recipient and, if aid is 
provided, how much aid is allocated.  I argue that donors consider the salience of these 
concessions when deciding whether to punish human rights violators.  If a donor decides 
to punish a potential recipient by withholding or reducing aid, the opportunity cost of 
such action is losing the policy concession.  I expect, therefore, that as the value of the 
concessions increases, the probability that a donor decides to punish a violator decreases.  
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I conceptualize the salience of policy concessions using two dimensions: security and 
economic ties.  
3.4.1 Security Ties 
Many scholars place national security at the top of any list of foreign policy goals 
(c.f. Morgenthau 1951; Waltz 1979; Kennan 1985).  It would be too idealistic to assume 
that human rights concerns can trump national security concerns in making foreign 
policy.  In fact, punishing human rights violators may be counterproductive to security 
goals.  For example, violators may respond to being punished by retaliating in such a way 
that hurts the donor’s national security interests.  For example, a recipient may restrict 
donor access to military bases or air space.  In a 1979 lecture on foreign policy and 
human rights, Morgenthau states: 
We have a great interest in continuing the normalization of our relations with 
mainland China, and for this reason we are not going to hurt her feelings.  On 
the other hand South Korea is an ally of the United States, it is attributed a 
considerable military importance, and so we are not going to do anything to 
harm those relations. (Morgenthau 1979: 7). 
 
Another example of the strategic importance of foreign aid lies in Cold War foreign 
policy.  In particular, western donors were concerned that cutting foreign aid could 
precipitate a fall to communism.  For example, the United States used its foreign aid 
program during the Cold War to prop rightist regimes in the western hemisphere to 
contain communism (c.f. Carleton & Stohl 1986; Apodaca & Stohl 1999; Regan 1995).  
In addition, foreign aid often directly or indirectly supported repressive regimes over 
leftist opposition (Regan 1995).  In these cases, cutting aid would have clear negative 
implications for the donor’s strategic interests.  Morgenthau’s concern – and he is not 
alone (c.f. Gillies 1996) – is that criticizing or punishing a human rights violator would 
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very likely harm relations with that country and, in turn, the soured relationships could 
hurt the strategic or material interests of the donor.    
When donors use foreign aid to punish human rights violators, that foreign aid 
cannot be used to buy important policy concessions.  This represents the opportunity cost 
for using foreign aid as a punishment tool.  If a donor has an interest in buying a policy 
concession from a recipient, then it is unlikely to manipulate its aid policy to punish 
human rights violations when, instead, it needs to provide aid to buy the policy 
concession.  One way to conceptualize the strategic importance of potential donors is 
security alignment.  Donors are more inclined to buy policy concessions from states with 
which they are closely aligned than enemies.  Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) find 
that “recipients who are moderately aligned with the donor receive the most aid” (331).  If 
security alignment signifies the presence of important policy concessions, then it follows 
that close allies are unlikely to be punished for human rights violations because these 
countries can offer the donor valuable policy concessions.  For example, until the mid-
1970s, the United States consistently turned a blind eye to rights violations by South 
American dictators with whom the U.S. was allied.   
Hypothesis 1: Donors are less likely to punish recipients as the strategic 
alignment between them increase, all else equal.   
3.4.2 Economic Ties 
 Just as donors will be reluctant to put a strain on ties with an important strategic 
partner, they will be hesitant to punish a key economic partner.  The consequences of 
punishing an important economic partner are both indirect and direct.  As with security 
relationships, there is a risk that the recipient will retaliate, damaging the donor’s 
economic interests.  Recipients may react by restricting access to markets or to raw 
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materials. Reduced aid also has indirect costs associated with its effect on the recipient’s 
economy. .  Official development assistance affects the terms of trade, allowing capital-
poor countries to purchase more capital-intensive goods from capital-rich countries 
(Milner and Tingley 2009). If the recipient’s economy is sufficiently hurt by the 
suspension or reduction in aid, then the recipient will be less able to engage in trade with 
the donor country. Direct costs are also possible, as cutting certain types of foreign 
assistance directly affects firms that initially benefited from tied aid or development 
projects in the recipient country.  Finally, as discussed in the context of security salience, 
there is an opportunity cost associated with cutting aid.  If the donor was using the 
foreign aid to buy valuable policy concessions - such as access to markets or raw 
materials - then cutting aid to punish violators may directly affect the donor’s ability to 
obtain the policy concession it sought.   
 Building economic relationships is often a primary objective of foreign assistance, 
especially for the so-called “middle powers”.  According to Gillies (1996), Dutch, 
Canadian, and Norwegian official development assistance to China was strongly driven 
by economic interests, “using aid to help domestic firms gain a foothold in an enormous 
market” (Gillies 1996, 161).  Following the Tiananmen Square incident, donors faced the 
challenge of finding “some middle ground by choosing actions that would convey moral 
conviction but would not isolate China, damage nurtured relations, or risk reprisal” 
(Gillies 1996, 168).  In fact, Gillies (1996) argues that Norway, the Netherlands, and 
Canada reacted to China’s human rights abuses in the Tiananmen Square incident more 
than one would expect, given its commercial interests.  He argues that the fact each 
country was not acting alone provided, in a sense, some political cover for taking a stance 
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against China.  At the same time, these countries chose which policy levers to use 
selectively to minimize the potential damage to domestic interests.  This was especially 
true in Canada’s case.  Canada chose to shut down some funding projects, but kept the 
most lucrative ones going. Indeed, Canada was able “to set what seemed like morally 
principled restrictions on aid and credits, but which actually imposed few real costs on 
Canadian exporters” (Gillies 1996, 171).  
Donors were reluctant to employ assertive policy tools to punish China for its 
human rights violations largely because of strong commercial ties.   In contrast, the Dutch 
did not depend heavily on their economic ties to Suriname and exerted strong pressure 
without concern for the commercial costs of such assertive policy. The Dutch also 
convinced the United States, Canada, Brazil, and Venezuela to suspend aid to Suriname.   
This was largely a symbolic move because the value of the aid from these donors to 
Suriname was quite low and, perhaps more importantly, these donors did not have other 
vested interests in their relationships with Suriname.  In comparing their reaction to 
human rights violations by two former colonies, the Dutch harshly punished Suriname, 
but refrained from punishing Indonesia, which was an important commercial partner 
(Gillies 1996). 
Based on the above discussion, I expect that if the donor’s economy depends 
heavily on its relationship with the violating state, then the probability that the donor 
takes a costly action against the violator decreases.  I focus on two types of economic ties 
that could be particularly salient to the donor country.  First, I consider the importance of 
the recipient as an export market for the donor.  If the recipient is an important export 
market for the donor, then there are likely donor stakeholders who would be hurt if that 
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export market was lost.  This creates a cost for the policymakers in the donor country if 
aid was no longer used to buy that policy concession and access to that market was lost.  
Similarly, I also look at the amount of oil the recipient exports.  As an important 
commodity, this is another potential policy concession a donor may seek from potential 
recipients.  If the potential recipient is a high oil exporter, then donors may be less willing 
to punish it for fear of losing access to this important natural resource.  The above 
discussion leads to two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2: As the share of exports from a donor to a recipient increases, the 
donor becomes less likely to punish recipients, all else equal.  
 
Hypothesis 3: As the potential recipient’s level of petroleum exports increase, 
donors are less likely to punish the recipient, all else equal. 
3.4.3 Other Measures of Salience 
With these first three measures of salience - alignment, export share, and recipient 
oil exports - I attempt to capture the nature of the potential policy concessions.  In other 
words, alignment captures the value of potential strategic policy concessions, and export 
share and oil exports capture the value of economic policy concessions. Another way to 
measure salience is to ask what characteristics of recipients increase the potential value of 
policy concessions.  Rather than capturing the nature of policy concessions, either 
strategic or economic, this approach identifies potentially valuable recipients.  Bueno de 
Mesquita and Smith (2009) argue that donors will place more value on policy 
concessions from “geographically closer, more populous countries” (324).  They also 
assert that donors will value policy concessions from former colonies more than 
recipients without these historical ties.   
Following the logic I outlined with respect to the strategic and economic salience 
variables, I would expect donors to be least likely to punish recipients who have the 
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potential for offering valuable policy concessions.  This leads to the following three 
additional hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4: As the distance between the donor and recipient increase, the 
donor becomes more likely to punish the recipient, all else equal. 
 
Hypothesis 5: As the recipient’s population increases, the donor becomes less 
likely to punish the recipient, all else equal. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Donors are less likely to punish recipients who are former colonies 
than those who are not, all else equal. 
3.5 Applying Pressure: Exploring the Role of Non-Governmental Organizations 
Low opportunity costs to acting are a necessary condition, but not a sufficient 
condition to explain whether a donor will punish a violator.  In this section, I examine the 
role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in creating incentives for donors to 
punish human rights violators.  Given the myriad foreign policy objectives that 
policymakers face, they need some impetus to pay attention to human rights.  By drawing 
attention to a case of violations, NGOs can apply pressure - either directly or indirectly 
through constituents - to urge policymakers to take action.  In the absence of this 
mediating factor, I argue that policymakers are unlikely to punish human rights violators.   
In the absence of strong economic or security ties, cutting foreign aid is a low cost 
way for a donor to express moral outrage at human rights violations.   Yet the question 
still remains: what are the incentives for a donor country to express its condemnation for 
human rights abuses?  I argue that if there is substantial public pressure to respond, 
policy-makers in the donor country may be compelled to act primarily to avoid the 
negative repercussions of failing to act.  Rather than acting only out of concern for the 
human rights conditions in the violating country, policy-makers act to avoid negative 
domestic political consequences.  This appearance of an altruistic foreign policy has 
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political benefits for policymakers. Framing foreign policy in moral terms provides “an 
accessible and easily understood rationale” (Meernik, Kruger, and Poe 1998) for the 
public to support foreign policy agendas.  Forsythe (1990) underscores this point, 
referencing members of Congress who gained positive publicity through human rights 
foreign policy: Stephen Solarz and Richard Lugar for their work in the Philippines and 
Christopher Dodd and Nancy Kassebaum for sponsoring legislation on South Africa and 
Liberia.  That some policymakers may have underlying preferences for a moral foreign 
policy is not incompatible with these assumptions.  The commonly-held assumption that 
leaders wish to maximize their ability to gain and hold office suggests that leaders may 
not always act on their personal political preferences, but will act to maintain electability 
(c.f. Bueno de Mequita et al. 2003).  For this reason, leaders who prefer to use foreign 
policy to promote human rights should behave similarly to those who do not, allowing us 
to focus on the political incentives these leaders face in determining whether they will use 
foreign aid as a tool to punish violators.    
To capture the potential political benefits for politicians, I look at human rights 
advocacy efforts.  I argue that if there is little or no effort on the part of human rights 
advocates to draw attention to violations abroad, then leaders are unlikely to receive any 
benefit from acting on these violations.  They would, therefore, be unlikely to take any 
action against the violating state.  This provides a contrast to existing literature, which 
typically argues that donors respond primarily to changes in the actual human rights 
conditions in recipient countries.  Instead, I argue that NGOs play an important mediating 
role and that donors are more likely to punish violators when NGOs pay significant 
attention to the violations. If human rights advocates are successful in drawing attention 
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to a case of violations abroad, then leaders may perceive a benefit to acting.  NGOs 
matter because the presence of publicity gives governments an incentive to do something 
about human rights violations.  
Unlike policymakers who must respond to a range of demands, NGOs focus on a 
narrow set of concerns, giving them leverage on certain policy issues.  As Ann Marie 
Clark points out, NGOs “have become skilled at mounting such pressure by feeding 
information into pertinent public and governmental channels” (Clark 1995, 509).   In the 
1970s, Amnesty International and other NGOs took the lead on fact-finding missions to 
document the emerging trend of “disappearances” in Argentina.  The United States, along 
with France and Sweden, used the information gathered by the NGOs to base decisions to 
denounce Argentinean abuses and cut aid (Sikkink 1993a).  On the other hand, NGOs did 
not investigate and document abuses in Mexico in the late 1960s, which meant that other 
governments did not have credible information or pressure from NGOs to act (Sikkink 
1993a).  International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and transnational actors 
also played an important role in the abolition of slavery in the United States (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998).  Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue that the pressure applied by human rights 
NGOs is largely responsible for the development of human rights policies.   For example, 
Amnesty International was heavily involved in the human rights advisory committees set 
up by European governments in the 1990s (Keck and Sikkink 1998).  Advocacy groups 
“provide access, leverage, and information” and “convince international human rights 
organizations, donor institutions, and/or great powers to pressure norm-violating states” 
(Risse & Sikkink 1999, 18).9  
                                                
9 It is important to note that Amnesty International’s formal policy prohibits the organization from 
requesting that a donor suspends aid as a punishment for human rights violations.  Its internal sanctions 
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In sum, I argue that leaders respond to human rights advocacy efforts to avoid 
domestic political costs that these advocates would impose on leaders that fail to act in 
the face of violations.  The assumption I make is that leaders who defend human rights 
abroad will be heralded by these advocates and should, all else equal, receive a benefit 
from this publicity.   This argument does not necessarily depend on a strong pro-human 
rights constituency in these states, nor is it necessarily only relevant to democratic states.  
The assertion that, all else equal, a pro-human rights foreign policy would benefit leaders 
is relatively benign.  Simply put, I assume that absent other constraints and costs, people 
would like other people to be treated well. As Goldsmith and Posner succinctly state, 
“people in states care about people in other states, and sometimes, especially in 
democracies where voter preferences matter, these cares influence government action” 
(Goldsmith and Posner 2005, 109).  Further, official development assistance is not a 
foreign policy tool that is very visible to the average citizen. If a government wants to 
claim that it is “doing something” about human rights abuses, it can point to cuts in aid. 
Yet, it is not likely to resort to this tactic unless it is under pressure to “do something”, or 
what Baehr and Castermans-Holleman (2004) refer to as the “mobilization of shame”.10  
Western, civilized governments do not want to appear complacent with human rights 
violators; policymakers, therefore, are more likely to act when violations have been 
                                                
policy is summarized as:“AI takes no stand on the legitimacy of military, economic or cultural relations 
being maintained with countries where human rights are violated, unless AI can show that such relations 
can be reasonably assumed to contribute to human rights violations” (Susan Waltz, personal 
communication, August 16, 2010).  Although Amnesty does not directly recommend using aid to sanction 
human rights violators, it is in the donor’s discretion to apply (or not apply) pressure as it sees fit.   
10 A question that plagues the literature on foreign aid and human rights - and likely policymakers 
addressing the issue - is whether cutting aid might lead to a deterioration of human rights.  The actual 
effects of foreign aid on human rights is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Yet, what is relevant to the 
current research is if policymakers believe that cutting aid could be deleterious to conditions, then they may 
increase aid in response to violations rather than cut aid.  Ultimately, this is an empirical question.  If I do 
not find that donors cut aid in response to violations, this may be an alternative explanation to be explored 
in future research.   
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publicized to avoid the appearance of complicity.  The Netherlands reacted to Suriname 
abuses, in part, out of a “moral desire to avoid complicity” (Gillies 1996, 69).  
Policymakers “are more likely to be persuaded to act on behalf of human rights, in the 
face of media attention or the threat of it” (Baehr and Castermans-Holleman 2004, 120).  
Absent this attention, the “mobilization of shame” is not activated, leaving policymakers 
little political incentives to act to punish violators.   
 Unlike previous literature, I argue that consideration of the level of human rights 
violations themselves are secondary in donor decisions to punish.  Instead, I hypothesize 
that donors pay attention to NGO mobilization and act when policymakers believe that 
failing to act would be politically damaging.  This desire to avoid complicity drives 
decisions to respond to human rights violations more than the actual human rights 
violations.11  The relationship between the severity of rights abuses and NGO 
mobilization provides enough separation to test this claim.  Although the actual human 
rights conditions are one significant determinant of Amnesty International activity, they 
are not the only factor influencing mobilization.  Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers (2005) find 
that Amnesty International pays more attention to abuses by powerful states.  NGOs act 
to capitalize on “windows of opportunity” and increase their own visibility (Ron, Ramos, 
and Rodgers 2005).  By focusing on abuses by powerful countries, Amnesty International 
and other NGOs may be able to build more momentum and make a bigger difference 
(Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers 2005). 
                                                
11 For this reason, I am also not concerned here with the effectiveness of using foreign aid as a tool to 
punish human rights violators.  I would suggest that donors do not necessarily pick the most effective tool, 
but rather the least costly tool to demonstrate their moral outrage.  Of course, the effectiveness of foreign 
policy tools for influencing human rights is an interesting topic of its own; but it is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.   
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 Further, I argue that there is an interactive relationship between NGO 
mobilization and the salience of policy concessions.  When donors value policy 
concessions the recipient can provide, it is unlikely that donors will punish violators even 
if they are the focus of NGO mobilization.  In this case, the opportunity cost of losing the 
policy concession outweighs any benefit the policymaker might earn by punishing a 
human rights violator.  As I discussed in the previous section, the opportunity cost of 
punishing recipients increases as the salience of the policy concessions increase.  I 
expect, therefore, that donors will be most likely to punish recipients who do not have 
valuable policy concessions to offer.  At the same time, this is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition.  The presence of NGO pressure provides donor policymakers with 
an incentive to act.   From the preceding discussion, I derive a new hypothesis and re-
phrase the existing hypotheses to reflect the interactive nature of the explanation: 
Mediation Hypothesis: The direct effect of human rights is mediated by NGO 
pressure. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure 
increases, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the strategic 
importance of the recipient to the donor increases. 
  
Hypothesis 2: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure 
increases, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the share of exports 
from the donor to recipient increases.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure 
increases, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the recipient’s 
petroleum exports increase. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure 
increases, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the distance between 
the donor and recipient decreases. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure 





Hypothesis 6: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure 
increases, but this relationship is less pronounced if the recipient is a former 
colony of the donor. 
 
The Mediation Hypothesis reflects my argument that NGO activity is a critical link in the 
causal process connecting human rights conditions in the recipient country and donor 
decision-making with respect to foreign aid.  The remaining hypotheses illustrate the 
interactive nature of my explanation.  As I argued, when policy concessions are salient to 
the donor, the opportunity cost of punishing recipients increases.   Each hypothesis 
corresponds to a different operationalization of the salience of the policy concession.  The 
interactive hypothesis captures my argument that donors will use foreign aid to punish 
violators when it is a low cost way to express moral outrage.   
3.6 Promoting Human Rights as a Public Good: The Role of Political Institutions 
Hafner-Burton (2009) argues that ignoring the political institutional context of 
foreign policy making neglects the important process by which preferences are translated 
into policy.  She points out that although policy-makers may have a given set of policy 
preferences – either their own inherent preferences or preferences derived from interest 
group pressure – the structure of the political institutions in that country determines how 
these preferences are aggregated and translated into policy.  I focus on how certain 
electoral structures are more likely to incentivize concern for human rights and, by 
extension, vulnerability to NGO pressures to respond to human rights violations.  Policies 
to promote and protect human rights abroad fall in the category of public goods - these 
policies are non-rivalrous and non-excludable.  Additionally, unlike many other issues, 
there are not specific geographical implications to promoting and protecting human rights 
abroad. For example, trade policy often has geographically-specific constituents (e.g. the 
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steel belt in the United States has strong preferences for raising tariffs to restrict the 
import of steel from other countries). It is not clear, on the other hand, that a concern for 
human rights would have geographically-specific constituencies.  I would expect, 
therefore, that political institutional structures that encourage the promotion of national, 
public goods interests over narrow, regional interests would be more likely to punish 
human rights violators.   
 Before discussing the institutional incentives for policymakers to pay attention to 
human rights abroad, it is important to provide some rationale for why I expect 
constituents to care about human rights abroad.  Here, I apply Ingelhart’s theory of 
postmaterialism to explain why constituents in particular countries - notably post-
industrial societies - are likely to care about the human rights conditions of people in 
other countries.  In a post-industrial society, individuals have high levels of existential 
security, relieving them of an immediate concern of survival.  Once this threat has been 
removed, individuals can “focus on problems that are not of an immediate concern to 
themselves” (Ingelhart and Welzel 2005, 33).  In particular, individuals in post-industrial 
societies value freedom and autonomy.  Inglehart and Welzel “argue that self-expression 
values are not egocentric but humanistic: they emphasize not only autonomy for oneself, 
but for others as well, motivating movements for the rights of children, women, gays and 
lesbians, handicapped people, and ethnic minorities and such universal goals as 
environmental protection and ecological sustainability” (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 12).  
Although they only briefly mention human rights, Inglehart and Welzel do extend their 
concept of “self-expression” values to caring about others in general and human rights in 
particular (Inglehart and Welzel 2005).  I expect, therefore, that concern for human rights 
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is a self-expression value and will be prevalent in post-industrial societies.  Survey results 
in post-industrial countries support this assumption.12   
 The Council on Foreign Relations 2006 survey finds that 86% of Americans 
believe that promoting and defending human rights abroad should be at least a 
“somewhat important” goal of US foreign policy while only 28% believe it is “very 
important” (Council on Foreign Relations 2006)13.   Not surprisingly, this concern 
consistently ranks behind other foreign policy goals, such as protecting American jobs 
and maintaining a strong military (McFarland and Mathews 2005).  The January 1996 
Eurobarometer survey found that between 73 and 88% of respondents in European Union 
countries believed that “promoting the defence of human rights” should be a “key 
priority” for the European Union (Eurobarometer).  In a November 2001 survey, 
European respondents said that it was important that prospective EU members respect 
human rights and the principles of democracy (Eurobarometer).  This pattern extends to 
other OECD members.  A 2005 survey in Australia found that 85% of respondents think 
“promoting human rights abroad” is an important or very important foreign policy 
objective (Cook 2005).  In 1994, 60% of Japanese respondents said that Japan “should 
help promote human rights in the Asia-Pacific region” (United States Information 
Agency 1994).   These public opinion findings support the assumption that, in many 
countries, voters think promoting human rights abroad is an important foreign policy 
                                                
12 Unfortunately, I cannot compare the results from post-industrial to industrial societies because questions 
about the promotion of human rights abroad were only asked in post-industrial countries.  Surveys from 
Afrobarometer, Arab Barometer, and Asian Barometer did not ask respondents about human rights as a 
foreign policy goal.  In the Latin American Barometer the question was only asked in reference to shared 
priorities with the United States.  The fact that surveys in these regions do not ask this question may 
support the point that the promotion of human rights is not on the foreign policy agenda in these countries. 
13 Taking the average response in polls between 1974 and 2002, 42% Americans ranked promoting and 
defending human rights as “very important” and 22% as “somewhat important” (McFarland and Mathews 
2005).   
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objective, although they tend to prioritize it lower than traditional economic and security 
goals.  Cingranelli and Filippov (2010) argue that “as long as human rights are a concern 
for most voters but a lesser concern than some other issue… politicians elected in single-
member districts would be expected to do less to protect human rights than politicians 
elected under proportional representation” (246). Although they seek to explain electoral 
incentives to protect human rights domestically, I would argue that we can apply this 
logic to promoting human rights abroad. These public opinion survey results cited above 
support the contention that human rights fit the pattern Cingranelli and Filippov describe, 
namely that voters care about human rights but not above other issues.  
Following Cingranelli and Filippov (2010), I consider the policymaking 
incentives produced by electoral rules.   Scholars, building on the framework provided by 
Duverger’s Law, note that “majoritarian rule favors local public good provisions over 
national public good provisions whereas under the proportional rule it is the opposite” 
(Rausser and Roland 2009, 13).  Specifically, electoral permissiveness - often measured 
as district magnitude - matters.  Electoral permissiveness determines whether the 
candidates internalize votes in non-marginal districts.  In majoritarian - or single member 
district plurality (SMDP) - systems, the margin of victory is irrelevant; once a candidate 
receives more than 50% of the votes, the remaining votes are inconsequential.  In terms 
of the trade-off between public goods and redistributive transfers, this incentivizes 
policy-makers in SMDP electoral systems to focus policies on the median voter in the 
median district, since winning there tips the scales in his favor.  Redistributive transfers 
are an efficient way to target these voters.  As Rausser and Roland (2009) argue: 
“…proposing local public goods targeted to the pivotal voter in the pivotal district is 
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electorally “cheaper” than proposing national public goods” (13). 
On the other hand, in proportional representation (PR) systems with high district 
magnitudes, the margin of victory matters. Emphasizing redistributive policies in high 
district magnitude systems, therefore, comes at a higher cost.  Although there is still an 
incentive to offer redistributive policies to swing voters, the level of redistributive 
transfers depends on the size of the swing group since giving more to one group means 
there is less revenue available for public goods for the remaining voters (Persson and 
Tabellini 1999).  “This is because, in order for transfers to be a profitable strategy against 
the public good, a majority of the voters must receive transfers that exceed the value of 
the public good; the resource constraint then dictates that the remaining voters receive 
correspondingly lower transfers” (Lizzeri and Persico 2001, 234).   Further, in a 
proportional system, “[s]ince national public goods have many externalities, they may 
deliver more utility per voter per unit of tax revenue.” (Rausser and Roland 2009, 13).  
All else equal, then, majoritarian systems are expected to provide a lower supply of 
public goods than proportional representation systems (Persson and Tabellini 1999; 
Lizzeri and Persico 2001).  By the logic presented here, if we accept that promoting 
human rights abroad is a public good, then states with permissive electoral rules should 
be more likely to provide this public good.14  
 In addition, many scholars note that proportional representation systems allow for 
greater representation of diverse interests, because smaller parties can win seats and 
participate in government coalitions by representing these “niche” interests.  In contrast, 
in SMDP systems where only the candidate with the highest number of votes wins a seat, 
                                                
14 For example, the Netherlands is characterized by its high electoral permissiveness and one of its political 




these small parties would not be able to win seats and influence policy (c.f. Bawn and 
Rosenbluth 2006).  The relevance of human rights promotion as a national foreign policy 
goal is, I would argue, likely to be greater in multi-party systems where “niche” interests 
are more likely to be represented.  Meguid (2005) defines niche parties as those that 
“reject the traditional class-based orientation of politics” and “often do not coincide with 
existing lines of political division” (347-348). Even when they fail to gain seats in the 
national legislature, these parties influence the agendas of mainstream parties by 
introducing issues and forcing mainstream parties to respond (Meguid 2005).  The two 
most common types of niche parties are Green and radical right.  Green parties have, in 
some instances, adopted the promotion of human rights abroad as a platform issue.  The 
Green Party of the UK, for example, has a “human rights spokesperson” and includes 
multiple mentions of human rights in its platform.15  The foreign policy section of the 
Canadian Green Party also discusses the importance of protecting human rights.16  The 
Green Party of the United States similarly advocates for the protection of human rights 
abroad.17  Aside from being a part of Green Party platforms, the defense of human rights 
is also a key point of the Dutch D66 party mission and platform.18  
Based on the above discussion, I hypothesize that as electoral rules become more 
permissive, policymakers are more likely to punish human rights violators.   
Hypothesis 7: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure 
increases, and this relationship becomes more pronounced as the donor’s district 
magnitude increases. 
 









 A few scholars (Barratt 2007; Gillies 1996) argue that the inconsistent application 
of human rights conditionality to foreign aid is largely explained by commercial and 
security interests.  These two key pieces of literature also suggest that domestic and NGO 
pressures to act matter, however neither scholar examines the relationship between costs 
– in commercial and security terms – and benefits in a systematic way.   To advance this 
literature, I develop an argument that integrates the potential costs of punishing human 
rights violators with a discussion of a source of benefit.  In particular, I acknowledge, as 
Barratt and Gillies do, that donors fear the negative consequences of punishing violators.  
These costs, be they direct or indirect, may damage donor commercial or security 
interests.  I argue that as the donor’s dependence on these relationships increases, the less 
likely it will be to punish a violator because the opportunity cost increases.  The 
hypotheses, presented in Table 3-1, illustrate particular economic and strategic 
relationships that I expect to matter.  Specifically, recipients that account for significant 
trade with the donor or are a source of natural resources are less likely to face punishment 
due to the economic costs the donor may suffer.  On the security side, military alliances 
are the key dimension along which I expect donors to measure the potential costs of 
punishing a violator.  I also consider characteristics of the recipients that increase the 
value donors place on the policy concessions.  Regardless of the nature of the concession 
- economic or strategic - Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) argue that donors will 
simply value the concessions more when they are from geographically proximate 
countries, more populous countries, or former colonies. 
 Low costs may be a necessary condition for donors to punish recipients; they are 
not, however, a sufficient condition.  I argue that we also need a systematic explanation 
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of the potential benefits that donors perceive for punishing human rights violators.  In 
other words, why would policymakers in a donor country, even in absence of high costs, 
decide to reduce or eliminate foreign aid to a recipient who is violating the human rights 
of its citizens?   Unlike potential economic and strategic costs, the possible benefits to 
policymakers are intangible and difficult to conceptualize.   When donors punish human 
rights violators, they do so primarily to avoid complicity with violators and to present at 
least the impression of a moral foreign policy.  The need to avoid complicity increases 
with the salience of the violations.  Violations that are relatively unknown to the donor 
public are unlikely to create enough of a moral desire to act.  I argue, therefore, that as 
NGO activity pertaining to a set of violations increases, donors are more likely to act.  
Table 3-1: Main Hypotheses 
Mediation Hypothesis: The direct effect of human rights is mediated by NGO pressure. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure increases, but this relationship 
becomes less pronounced as the strategic importance of the recipient to the donor increases. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure increases, but this relationship 
becomes less pronounced as the share of exports from the donor to recipient increases. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure increases, but this relationship 
becomes less pronounced as the recipient’s petroleum exports increase. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure increases, but this relationship 
becomes less pronounced as the distance between the donor and recipient decreases. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure increases, but this relationship 
becomes less pronounced as the recipient’s population decreases. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure increases, but this relationship 
is less pronounced if the recipient is a former colony of the donor. 
 
Hypothesis 7: Recipients are more likely to get punished as NGO pressure increases, and this relationship 
becomes more pronounced as the donor’s district magnitude increases. 
 
As discussed above, I diverge from the existing literature in the level of 
importance I place on NGO activity.  More specifically, I argue that, ceteris paribus, 
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NGO publicity acts a mediating variable through which human rights conditions 
influence foreign aid decision-making.  I argue that policymakers are responding more to 
the publicity of violations than to the violations themselves.  Additionally, I argue that 
this mediating effect depends on the salience of the policy concession. At high levels of 
salience, donors are unlikely to risk losing the policy concession to punish recipients even 
under significant NGO pressure.  Further, I present an argument that political institutions 
play a modifying role.  Donors with more permissive electoral rules are more likely to 
respond to NGO mobilization for two reasons. First, in these countries, legislators 
prioritize national public goods over regional ones.  Second, proportional representation 
systems encourage multi-party systems.  In contrast to a two-party system produced by 
majoritarian electoral rules, multi-party systems leave room for different policy issues to 




Chapter 4  
Research Design 
 
 In this chapter, I will discuss the research methods I use to test the hypotheses I 
presented in the previous chapter.  The trend in the foreign aid literature is to divide 
foreign aid decisions into two stages: the gate-keeping stage when donors decide whether 
to give aid to a potential recipient and the allocation stage when donors decide how much 
aid to give to recipients that pass the first stage (c.f. Neumayer 2003; Apodaca and Stohl 
1999).  Chapter 5 will examine the former, while Chapter 6 will explore the allocation 
stage.  This chapter will proceed as follows. First, I will discuss the variables I use in the 
models.  Second, I will present the models tested in the following chapters, as well as 
discuss the methods used.   
4.1 Variables 
4.1.1 Dependent Variable 
I first ask the question whether donors punish human rights violators by 
withholding aid in a given period.  I use the data collected by Bueno de Mesquita and 
Smith from the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
official development assistance records (2009).  For the analyses in Chapter 5, I use a 
variable, AnyAid, which captures whether the donor gave any aid to the recipient in a 
given year.  This is a dichotomous variable, coded as a 1 if a recipient received aid and a 
0 otherwise.  In 67% of the nearly 50,000 dyad-year observations in the dataset, the 
recipient receives aid. 
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In Chapter 6, I will explore donor decision-making at the allocation stage.  The 
existing literature approaches this question primarily using two dependent variables. 
Most scholars (c.f. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Gates and Hoeffler 2004; Barratt 
2008; Carleton and Stohl 1986) simply use total aid, or the natural log of total aid.  
Neumayer (2003) uses aid to a recipient as a share of total aid from the donor.  I agree 
with Neumayer (2003) that: “[s]uch a dependent variable probably represents the actual 
decision-making process best. There is a fixed aid allocation budget that decides which 
recipient country receives how big a share of the total cake, if anything” (107).  Since my 
explanation and hypotheses center on the donor decision-making process, it makes the 
most sense to use a dependent variable that captures the constraints on the donor (budget 
for foreign aid) and the subsequent decision to grant a share of that aid to a particular 
recipient.19  I calculate the dependent variable by finding the total aid given by each 
donor and then, for each dyad, I divide aid from donor to recipient over total donor aid.  
In its original form, this variable is highly skewed.  The mean value of the share of total 
donor aid a particular recipient receives is 0.01 (in other words, the average recipient 
receives 1% of the donor’s total aid), while the median is 0.002.  To account for the 
skewedness of this variable, I use the natural log of the share of aid as my dependent 
variable in Chapter 6.   
4.1.2 Independent Variables: Human Rights 
The first key independent variable of interest reflects the human rights conditions 
in the recipient state.  I use the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset to 
capture recipients’ human rights records.  The CIRI database includes measures of 
                                                
19 I also test for robustness using the natural log of total aid as the dependent variable. 
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government practice on 13 internationally recognized human rights in 195 countries over 
25 years, 1981-2006.  This data has the advantage of being comprehensive in its coverage 
of human rights practice, as it uses both the United States Department of State Country 
Reports on Human Rights and Amnesty International’s reports to code violations.   In this 
analysis, I will focus on physical integrity rights, which include forced disappearances, 
extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment, and torture.   I focus on physical integrity 
rights because - although many human rights scholars avoid assigning a hierarchy to 
human rights - there are certain rights that are deemed “non-derogable” and cannot be 
violated even in a state of emergency (c.f. Baehr and Castermans-Holleman , 2004, 8).   
For each component of physical integrity rights, the CIRI data codes frequent 
violations of a given human right in a given year as a “0”, occasional violations as a “1”, 
and no violations as a “2”.  The physical integrity rights measure aggregates the four 
component scores, resulting in scores ranging from “0” (frequent violators of all four 
rights) to “8” (no violations in any of the four categories).  For ease of discourse, 
however, I invert this scale.  Since I am interested in how donors respond to human rights 
violations, it is more intuitive to operationalize “frequent” violations as an “8” and no 
violations as a “0”.  I use the physical integrity score as my human rights variable, HR.  
The average human rights score is 3.67, with a standard deviation of 2.3.  I also create 
one-year lag of the HR variable.  In making aid allocation decisions for year t, donors 
would be looking at human rights conditions from t-1 at the most recent.  
4.1.3 Independent Variables: Value of Policy Concessions 
I hypothesized in the previous chapter that the economic importance of the 
recipient to the donor matters.  First, I consider how valuable the recipient is as an export 
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market for the donor.20  As the value of the export relationship to the donor increases, I 
expect the donor to be less likely to punish a recipient who violates human rights.21 I 
draw on the Gleditsch (2002) trade data to construct a variable to capture the importance 
of the recipient as an export market for the donor.  I calculate the total exports from each 
donor.  Then, for each observation, I divide the export from donor i to recipient j.  The 
mean value of the share of total donor exports to recipient i is 0.004, meaning that 0.4% 
of a donor’s exports goes to the recipient.  The median value is 0.0003, showing a 
skewed distribution.  I create a variable, export share, which is the natural log of value of 
the donor exports to the recipient divided by total donor exports.22  I expect that as this 
value increases, the likelihood of punishing a violating recipient would decrease.  
The second measure of economic salience is the potential recipient’s level of 
petroleum exports.  Using data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, I 
created a variable of the total amount of refined petroleum products the recipient 
exported in a given year.23  This variable is measured in thousand barrels per day.  Not 
surprisingly, this variable has a highly skewed distribution, with a mean of 53 (standard 
                                                
20 I focus on export market importance here because looking at trade total risks confounding protectionist 
sentiments with concern over human rights.  In other words, if the recipient provides a significant amount 
of imports into the donor country, there may be protectionist pressures to limit those imports.  Therefore, 
reducing aid wouldn’t be considered a net cost in this case.   
21 Another potential measure of economic importance is the level of imports from recipient to donor.  
Similar to Hafner-Burton’s (2009) argument about business interests favoring preferential trade agreements 
for economic rather than moral reasons, import-competing industries in the donor may push policymakers 
to punish human rights violators for protectionist reasons.  I save this argument for future research. 
22 I first add 1 to every value, to eliminate any ln(0), since there are some dyads with zero donor exports to 
the recipient.    
23 At this point, I only measure total oil exports of the recipient, rather than exports from a particular 
recipient to each individual donor.  Conceptually, this assumes that if a recipient has oil, the donor has an 
interest in maintaining good relations and access to that oil even if they are not actively buying from that 
recipient at that time.  Specific dyadic petroleum data is not readily available.   
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deviation is 166) and median of 0.489 thousand barrels per day.    I take the natural log 
and create the variable oil.24 
In addition to economic value, I hypothesize that the salience of strategic policy 
concessions modifies donor’s responses to human rights violations.  The simplest way to 
capture strategic importance is by measuring the donor-recipient alignment (Bueno de 
Mesquita and Smith 2009).  I use Kendall’s global tau b score as a measure of security 
closeness between donor and recipient and name this variable, alignment.  This variable 
can range from -1 to +1, but in this dataset the actual range is -0.36 to 1.  To create an 
easy to interpret elasticity, I convert this variable to the natural log.  To be able to 
calculate the natural log of this variable, I do a monotonic transformation, adding 1 so 
that all values are positive.25  Then I take the natural log.  
 In addition to these three variables measuring the salience of policy concessions, I 
will also include Bueno de Mesquita and Smith’s measures of the potential value of 
policy concessions.  They argue that donors will value policy concessions more from 
closer and more populous recipients, as well as former colonies.  If the policy 
concessions from these recipients are valued more, then I would expect donors to be less 
likely to punish these recipients.  Using their data, I will use the natural log of the 
distance (in miles) between the capital cities of each donor and potential recipient, 
distance, and the natural log of the recipient’s population, population.  Finally, the colony 
variable is coded as a 1 if the recipient was a former colony of the donor and 0 otherwise.   
                                                
24 I also add 1 to every value to eliminate zeros. 
25 Because the actual range is -0.36 to 1, I do not encounter a problem with taking the natural log of 0.  The 
results are substantively the same with the unlogged tau, but using the natural log allows for an ease in 
interpretation since the dependent variable, share of aid, is also logged. 
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4.1.4 Independent Variables: NGO Pressure 
Next, I operationalize the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Ron, 
Ramos, and Rodgers (2005) count the total number of Amnesty International (AI) news 
releases on a given country in a given year from 1986-2000.  One significant drawback to 
this variable is that it measures the activities of only one NGO.  Also, it does not consider 
the activities of AI in a specific donor country, but the overall efforts of the international 
secretariat.  In other words, if Amnesty targets messages to one particular donor, this 
variable does not capture this differentiation.  Despite these important disadvantages, 
Ron, Ramos, and Rodger’s data provides a useful starting point in examining the 
mediating role of NGOs.  Amnesty International is the largest NGO dedicated to human 
rights and has a reputation for being a reliable and trustworthy source of information 
(Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers 2005).  I generate a measure of NGO pressure using Ron, 
Ramos, and Rodgers (2005) data.  The data on Amnesty news releases is highly skewed.  
It ranges from 0 to 50, but 70% of cases have no news releases.  I therefore transform this 
variable into its natural log, after a monotonic transformation where I add one to 
eliminate the zero.  I take the natural log of the total of news releases put out by AI in a 
given year as a continuous variable, AINR.26 
4.1.5 Independent Variables: Electoral Permissiveness 
The best existing measure of electoral permissiveness is district magnitude.  As 
district magnitude increases, the electoral permissiveness of the system increases (Cox 
1997).  I use Johnson and Wallack’s (2007) measure of the average district magnitude of 
                                                
26 There is an endogeniety concern with the use of AI data; Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers (2005) and Ron, 
Ramos, and Thoms (2007) test whether Amnesty is more likely to issue releases on violators that receive 
foreign aid.  They do not find any support for this hypothesis, which suggests that receiving foreign aid 
does not increase the likelihood that AI issues a release on a violator. 
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the donor’s lower house.27  This variable ranges from zero (single member district 
plurality systems) to 150 (Netherlands single country-wide district); the mean is 14 and 
median is 7.  I take the natural log of the district magnitude variable “to capture the 
intuition that the marginal effect of district magnitude is smaller as district magnitude 
increases” (Clark and Golder 2006, 689).  
4.1.6 Control Variables 
It is important to control for recipient regime type for a number of reasons.  There 
are two theoretical explanations for the link between recipient regime type and foreign 
aid.  First, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) hypothesize that donors will be more 
likely to give aid to recipients with small winning coalitions, since these leaders can pay 
their small winning coalitions to support unpopular policy concessions.  In addition, there 
is evidence that donors pay attention to the political institutions in recipient countries and 
punish non-democratic outcomes - such as political terror and election fraud - by 
withdrawing aid (Boulding and Hyde n.d.).  Additionally, there is a long-standing 
literature linking regime type to a country’s human rights conditions (Poe and Tate 1994; 
Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Henderson 1991).  Excluding a measure of regime type could 
lead to omitted variable bias, since it is likely correlated with both the dependent variable 
of aid and the independent variable of human rights.  I, therefore control for recipient’s 
democracy, using Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2003) measure for winning coalition, 
which ranges from 0 to 1. 
Existing literature on foreign aid often considers whether aid has a poverty 
reduction goal, or if aid is simply used to promote donor interests.  At the same time, it is 
                                                
27 I use the Particularlism dataset (Johnson and Wallack 2007) because it includes countries outside of 
Western Europe, unlike Matt Golder’s dataset.  
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often argued that poor countries may lack the capacity to have strong human rights 
records (Poe and Tate 1994; Henderson 1991).  Including recipient need as a control 
variable is important both to address the debate in the literature on whether needy 
countries get more aid and to avoid potential omitted variable bias.  To capture recipient 
need, I control for the logged GDP/capita of the recipient (Penn World Tables).  
Recipient income is the best available proxy for need; it has wide availability and is 
highly correlated with other potential measures of need, such as life expectancy 
(Neumayer 2003).  If needier recipients do, in fact, get more aid, this variable should 
capture that effect. 
 I also control for donor wealth, using GDP per capita data from the Penn World 
Tables.  My research question focuses on the decision-making process of the donor 
country.  For this reason, it is important to account for donor wealth as a component of 
this decision-making.  All else equal, one would expect wealthier donors to give more 
aid.  Finally, donors often favor particular recipients in foreign aid policy.  First, donors 
favor former colonies (Alesina & Dollar 2000); therefore, I include a colony control 
variable.  Finally, I control for Egypt and Israel, as aid to these countries is determined by 
their unique geopolitical importance, particularly to the United States (Alesina & Dollar 
2000).28  
All independent variables, except for colony, distance, and donor wealth, are 
lagged 1 year to account for the information that policy-makers would have available 
when making foreign aid decisions.   
                                                
28 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith’s (2009) dataset included these control variables.    
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4.2 Statistical Methods 
4.2.1 Gate-keeping Stage 
The structure of the data, as time-series cross-section (TSCS), presents statistical 
challenges because panel heteroskedasticity, autocorrleation and contemporaneous 
correlation are all likely.  For the gate-keeping models, the dichotomous nature of the 
dependent variable adds to this challenge by rendering many fixes to the TSCS involving 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression inappropriate.  Following the advice of Beck, Katz, 
and Tucker (1998), I include temporal variables - in this case temporal spline and 
previous “failure” variables - to account for the temporal dependence, after diagnostic 
tests indicate that the data are strongly temporally dependent.  Previous literature (c.f. 
Barratt 2008; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009) fails to account for this temporal 
dependence at the gate-keeping stage and this could have strong implications for their 
findings, producing inefficient estimates.29  Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) conclude their 
article by saying that:  
Temporal dependence in BTSCS [binary time-series cross-section] models is not 
a minor problem that can be ignored at the cost of a small error.  And there is no 
reason to commit these errors. The inclusion of temporal variables in the 
specification is a simple solution, available to all researchers, providing a low cost 
cure to the problem of temporally dependent BTSCS data (1284). 
 
The inclusion of the temporal variables captures the logical assumption that whether a 
recipient receives aid in one period depends on whether it received aid in another period.  
The log-likelihood test of the restricted model - without the temporal variables - and the 
full model confirm that there is strong temporal dependence.  I use Tucker’s STATA add-
on file to create natural cubic splines, which are included to model the temporal 
                                                
29 Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) show that failing to account for temporal dependence can be very 
consequential.  They re-assess Oneal and Russett’s (1997) findings regarding the liberal peace and, 
although the re-analyses supports the findings with respect to regime type and peace, they do not hold for 
the relationship between trade and peace.   
 
 56 
dependence.30  To mitigate the problems associated with panel heteroskedasticity, I will 
use Huber-White standard errors (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). 
 The nature of my dataset presents a few additional challenges in applying Beck, 
Katz, and Tucker’s solution.  First, repeated events are common.  In other words, most 
recipients receive aid in multiple years.  The temporal variable approach assumes that 
second and subsequent events are independent, an assumption that is unlikely to hold in 
my data.  They propose a simple solution of including a variable that is simply a count of 
the number of previous events.  I include a variable that measures previous “failures,” 
which counts the number of previous years the recipient received aid from that donor.  
The second potential problem is left-censoring.  If all dyads were equally left-censored, 
then the approach is appropriate (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998); that is not the case, 
however, for my data.  Especially with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia, there are a number of recipients that enter the sample in 1991.  It would be 
inappropriate to count the years prior to entering the sample as years in which the country 
did not receive aid.  For countries that enter the sample mid-way, the spell-identification 
variable begins with the year the country enters the sample rather than the beginning of 
the sample.  For example, after re-gaining its independence in 1991, Latvia enters the 
sample.  Therefore the first year of its “spell” will be 1991 rather than 1981.31 
                                                
30 Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) note that temporal dummy variables that “mark the number of periods 
(usually years) since the start of the sample period or the previous occurrence of an “event” (such as war)” 
(Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998, 1261) are another correction for temporal dependence in logit & probit 
models.  They have a preference for splines because one can get a smooth baseline hazard function and use 
fewer degrees of freedom than the temporal dummy variable approach. 
31 Of the nearly 160 potential recipients in the sample, 28 of them enter after 1982. 
 
 57 
4.2.2 Allocation Stage 
  Potential heteroskedasticity, autocorrleation and contemporaneous correlation as 
equally problematic in the case of the allocation models, which have a continuous 
dependent variable.  Following much of the literature (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 
2009;), I correct for these problems using a lagged dependent variable, as well as donor 
fixed effects.32  In addition to correcting for serial autocorrelation, the lagged dependent 
variable represents the idea that foreign aid giving is “sticky” - without a significant 
change, foreign aid from one period should largely determine foreign aid in the next.  I 
use donor fixed effects because my explanation and hypotheses focus on donor decision-
making.  I also test for robustness using ordinary least squared regression and robust 
standard errors, without the donor fixed effects.33  
4.3 Models: The Mediation Effect of NGO Pressure 
In the models that follow, I conduct two separate analyses using each of the 
salience variables interacted with my measure of NGO pressure, Amnesty news releases.  
The two models serve to test the hypothesis that NGO pressure is a mediating variable 
and whether its mediation effect is modified by the salience of the policy concession.34  
Figure 4-1 diagrams the mediating effect of NGO attention on whether the donor 
punishes the violator.  In Figure 4-1, the path labeled “c” represents the direct effect of 
human rights on foreign aid.   The conditional indirect effect of human rights on foreign 
                                                
32 In fact, many scholars do not correct for both problems, sometimes including only a lagged dependent 
and sometimes offering no corrections for the problems presented by TSCS data (c.f. Gates and Hoeffler 
2004; Barratt 2008) 
33 Ideally, I would use Beck and Katz’s (1995) panel-corrected-standard-errors to correct for these 
problems.  Unfortunately, due to the severely unbalanced panels and size of my dataset, I was not able to 
use this procedure.  Due to countries entering and leaving the sample (e.g. the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union), the dataset has unbalanced panels.  I was, therefore, unable to use the casewise PCSE estimation.  
And, the computing power required for pairwise PCSE prohibited this technique.   
34 In the experimental psychology literature, this is referred to as “moderated mediation” or sometimes 
“conditional indirect effect” (c.f. Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt 2005).  These tests ask “is there a mediated 
effect” and “is the mediated effect different at different levels of the modifying variable”? 
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aid is the effect that is mediated by NGO attention, which is moderated by salience.35   
The causal process I am testing is: first, a potential recipient violates human rights and 
then, in some cases, will be subject to NGO attention.  If the value of the policy 
concessions the donor seeks is low, then I expect donors to respond to the NGO pressure 
by either withholding aid or reducing aid.   
Figure 4-1: The Mediating Effect of NGO Pressure, Modified by Salience 
 
Testing for mediation is a multi-step process.  First, I estimate each model without 
the mediating (AINR) and moderating (salience) variables and the interaction term.  This 
will estimate the total effect of human rights on foreign aid.  Next, I need to show that 
human rights conditions are correlated with NGO attention; in other words that path “a” 
in Figure 4-1 is statistically significant.  Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
develop a theoretical model for predicting NGO attention, there is evidence that the two 
are significantly related.  Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers (2005) find that human rights 
conditions are a significant predictor of AI news releases.  In my own dataset, the 
correlation between the two variables is 0.37 and statistically significant.  Finally, I 
                                                
35 I will test the argument that the mediation effect of NGO pressure is modified by district magnitude 
rather than salience in a separate model, discussed below.   
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estimate the models including the Amnesty variable for NGO attention, the salience 
variable, and their interaction term (Baron and Kenny 1986; Judd and Kenny 1981).  If 
NGO attention does, in fact, mediate the effect of human rights on foreign aid, then the 
direct effect of human rights in the set of models that include Amnesty news releases and 
salience would approach zero.36   
In addition to testing for mediation, I am also examining whether the value of 
policy concessions modifies the mediating effect of NGO attention.  In short, I am 
arguing that the marginal effect of NGO attention will be negative only when the salience 
of the policy concessions is low.  When testing for this conditional indirect effect, 
therefore, I interact the NGO pressure variable, AINR, with the salience variable.  This 
results in six models, one with each measure of salience.  
The general models, testing for the mediation effect of Amnesty news releases 
modified by salience are as follows37: 
Equation 1: Foreign Aid = β0 + β1HR + β2RecipientGDP/Cap + β3lnDistance + 
β4lnRpop + β5Egypt + β6Israel + β7Colony + β8RecipientWinningCoalition + 
β9DonorWealth + ε  
 
Equation 2: Foreign Aid = β0 + β1AINR+ β2Salience + β3AINR*Salience + β4HR + 
β5RecipientGDP/Cap + β6lnDistance + β7lnRpop + β8Egypt + β9Israel + β10Colony + 
β11RecipientWinningCoalition + β12DonorWealth + ε 
 
The first model, Equation 1, excludes NGO attention and salience, thereby testing the 
total effect of human rights on foreign aid.  The second model, Equation 2, includes 
Amnesty News Releases as a mediating variable modified by the salience of policy 
                                                
36 The strongest version of the mediation argument implies that the only effect of human rights on foreign 
aid is through NGO pressure.  In this case, I would expect the direct effect of human rights in the mediated 
models to be zero.  This is unlikely to be the case; instead NGO pressure may be one mechanism by which 
human rights affects foreign aid.  In the latter case, I would expect the coefficient on human rights in the 
mediated models to be closer to zero than in the unmediated models, although not necessarily zero.  
37 I do not include the control for donor wealth in the allocation models, because it makes little sense to ask 
how donor wealth affects the share of aid to a particular recipient since I am accounting for the donor’s aid 
budget in the denominator of the dependent variable.   
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concessions.  In Chapter 5, I will estimate each model with the dependent variable 
AnyAid, once for each measure of the potential value of the policy concession.  The six 
proxies for policy concession salience are: export share, recipient oil exports, security 
alignment, distance between recipient and donor, recipient population, and former 
colonial status.  In Chapter 6, I will estimate each model using the dependent variable 
measuring the share of total donor aid to each particular recipient.     
 In the previous chapter, I also presented a hypothesis that political institutions 
matter.  In particular, I argued that a donor is more likely to punish human rights violators 
as the electoral permissiveness - measured as district magnitude - increases.  Not unlike 
the salience moderation tests discussed above, I conceptualize this relationship as one of 
moderated mediation.  In other words, I expect NGO pressure to play a bigger role in 
donors with higher district magnitudes.  Figure 4-2 illustrates this argument.   
Figure 4-2: Mediating Effect of NGO Attention, Modified by Donor District Magnitude 
 
 The models to test the political institutions argument are: 
Equation 3: Foreign Aid = β0 + β1HR + β2RecipientGDP/Cap + β3lnDistance + 
β4lnRpop + β5Egypt + β6Israel + β7Colony + β8RecipientWinningCoalition + 




Equation 4: Foreign Aid = β0 + β1AINR+ β2DN + β3AINR*DM + β4HR + 
β5RecipientGDP/Cap + β6lnDistance + β7lnRpop + β8Egypt + β9Israel + β10Colony + 
β11RecipientWinningCoalition + β12DonorWealth + ε  
  
Where Equation 3 tests the total effect of human rights on foreign aid, without the 
mediating effect of NGO pressure. Equation 4 tests the mediating effect of NGO attention 
on foreign aid, conditional on district magnitude.   
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have detailed the variables and methods I will use to test the 
explanation and hypotheses I presented in Chapter 3.  I have also discussed the statistical 
challenges, particularly as they pertain to the time-series-cross-sectional nature of this 
data.  I presented the methods I will use in the following chapters to mitigate these 
statistical concerns, as well as to test the mediating effect of NGO pressure on foreign 
aid.  The next chapter will explore the effect of human rights at the gate-keeping stage, 
asking whether donors respond to violations - and, specifically, to violations that are 
publicized by Amnesty International news releases - by withholding aid.  Chapter 6 will 
examine how human rights and NGO pressure affects the amount of aid recipients 
receive, given they pass the gate-keeping stage.   
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Chapter 5  
Human Rights at the Gate-keeping Stage 
 
 In this chapter, I start by examining whether human rights violators are less likely 
to get aid than non-violators, conditional on the contextual relationships I discussed in 
Chapter 3.   Testing the mediating effect of Amnesty news releases, as well as the 
modifying effects of the salience of policy concessions and donor electoral institutions, 
requires two steps.  First, I will present the unmediated model, which shows the total 
effect of human rights on the probability a country receives foreign aid. This is without 
the mediating effect of NGO pressure and its interaction with policy concession salience 
or district magnitude.  In the remaining sections, I present the results of the mediated 
models, each with NGO pressure modified by a different salience variable and, in the 
final section of results, donor district magnitude.  By comparing the direct effect of 
human rights in the mediated models to the total effect in the unmediated model, I 
demonstrate that the effect of human rights on foreign aid is mediated through NGO 
mobilization.  I will also show that most measures of the salience of the policy 
concessions do modify the effect of NGO attention on the likelihood a recipient gets aid.  
In some cases, however, these conditional effects are contrary to my hypothesized 
predictions.   
5.1 Unmediated Models 
I expect that the effect of human rights on foreign aid is mediated through NGO 
mobilization and that the value of the policy concession modifies the effect of NGO 
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mobilization on aid.  In this section, I establish the baseline model to which I will 
compare the mediated models in the following sections.  This model includes human 
rights as an independent variable, but does not include the mediating effect of NGO 
pressure. This captures the total effect of human rights on foreign aid and is the first step 
in testing a mediation effect (c.f. Baron and Kenny 1986; Judd and Kenny 1981).  The 
unmediated model is: 
Equation 5: Pr(AID) = β0 + β1HR + β2RecipientGDP/Cap + β3lnDistance + β4lnRpop + 
β5Egypt + β6Israel + β7Colony + β8RecipientWinningCoalition + β9DonorWealth 
+β10PreviousFail +  β11-13Splines + ε  
 
In this model, and subsequent models in this chapter, I include four variables to 
account for the temporal dependence of the dependent variable.  As I discussed in chapter 
4, I use three temporal splines as recommended by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998). In 
addition, because there are multiple “failures” for each observation - in this model 
“failure” is when the dependent variable equals one or when a recipient gets aid - I 
include a control variable PreviousFailure, that captures the number of previous 
“failures”.   
 The second column of Table 5-1 presents the results of the probit analysis testing 
the unmediated model.  The effect of human rights in this model is negative and 
statistically significant.  Since this is a probit model, I calculate the predicted probability 
of receiving aid at different levels of human rights scores, while holding the other 
variables at their means or modes, and present this in Table 5-2.  Although the effect of 
human rights is statistically significant, the substantive effect is very small.  A change 
from the mean level of violations (3.6) to one unit above the mean reduces the probability 
of receiving aid by less than 0.5%.   
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AINR, logged -- -0.223*** 
(0.018) 
Alignment, logged -- 0.217** 
(0.086) 
AINR*Alignment -- -0.345*** 
(0.103) 




























































   
# of Observations 42, 842 41, 834 
R2 0.45 0.45 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 









Table 5-2: Predicted Probabilities, Unmediated Model & AINR Modified by Alignment 
 When Human Rights is at 
its Mean 
When Human Rights is 
one unit above the mean 
Change in 
Probability 
Predicted Probability of 






    
Predicted Probability of 
Receiving Aid (Model 1a) 
0.752 0.752 0.000 
    
Note: All other continuous variables held at their mean, dichotomous variables held at their mode 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 
  
The control variables also present some noteworthy findings.  Contrary to the 
conventional wisdom in the foreign aid literature, my results indicate that donors are 
more likely to give aid to needy recipients.38 The effects of other control variables are as 
expected.39  Donors are more likely to give aid to recipients who are geographically close, 
more populous, and former colonies.  Wealthier donors are also more likely to give aid 
than poor donors.  Finally, the results on the temporal variables show that there is strong 
temporal dependence and, importantly, indicate that the inclusion of these variables was 
necessary.40 
                                                
38 I attempted to account for this different finding by comparing my sample and specification to models that 
found a positive relationship between recipient income and aid.  Alesina and Dollar (2000) show a positive 
correlation between aid per capita and recipient income in their sample, where my sample produces a 
negative and statistically significant correlation.  This would suggest that the divergent findings are, at 
least, in part a function of the exact sample used. Other findings that call into question the poverty-
alleviating goal of foreign aid either use different variables for need (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009 
use life expectancy) or have restricted samples (e.g. McKinlay and Little 1977 only look at the United 
States, while Maizels and Nissanke (1984) look at the U.S., United Kingdom, Germany, France, and 
Japan). 
39 The coefficient on recipient winning coalition is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that 
recipients are more likely to get aid as their winning coalition increases, a result that is consistent with the 
literature arguing that donors reward democratic governance.  Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009), in 
testing their argument that recipients with small winning coalitions are more likely to “sell” policy 
concessions, include a quadratic term and find no relationship between recipient winning coalition and 
whether a recipient receives foreign aid. When I include the quadratic term in my model, I find the same 
results, while the results on the other variables remain unchanged.     
40 To avoid repetition, I will note here that these results on the control variables are consistent throughout 
the subsequent models.   
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5.2 Salience of Policy Concessions 
In this section, I present the results of the mediated models where the effect of 
NGO pressure is modified by six measures of policy concession salience.  My argument 
is that donors are more likely to punish recipients when there is NGO pressure to do so, 
unless the donor seeks valuable policy concessions from the recipient.  I derive the 
following general hypothesis: 
General Hypothesis: Recipients are less likely to get aid as Amnesty International 
News Releases increase, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the 
value of the policy concessions the donor seeks increase. 
 
As the salience of the policy concessions increases, the effect of NGO pressure - 
measured here as Amnesty news releases - should diminish.  In the sections that follow, I 
test this argument using six different measures for the salience of policy concessions, as I 
detailed in Chapter 3.  Security alignment captures the potential value of strategic policy 
concessions.  Donor export share and recipient oil exports each capture the potential 
salience of economic policy concessions.  Finally, the distance between donor and 
recipient, recipient’s population, and former colonial status measure how much the donor 
might value concessions from a particular recipient compared to other recipients.  
Equation 1 represents the model that I will estimate for each measure of salience.   
Equation 6:  Foreign Aid = β0 + β1AINR+ β2Salience + β3AINR*Salience + β4HR + 
β5RecipientGDP/Cap + β6lnDistance + β7lnRpop + β8Egypt + β9Israel + β10Colony + 
β11RecipientWinningCoalition + β12DonorWealth + β13PreviousFail + β14-16Splines + ε  
 
Throughout this chapter, I will also test the Mediation Hypothesis from the 
previous chapter, regarding the mediating effect of NGO attention. Once I account for the 
mediating effect of NGO attention, the direct effect of human rights on the probability of 
receiving aid should approach zero.  
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Mediation Hypothesis: The direct effect of human rights is mediated by NGO 
pressure. 
 
In the sections that follow, I will compare the direct effect of human rights to the 
total effect in the unmediated model presented in Table 5-1 to test the Mediation 
Hypothesis.  Using the interaction term in Equation 6, I will test how the salience of 
policy concessions modifies the effect of NGO pressure on the likelihood a recipient 
receives aid.  
5.2.1 Salience of Strategic Policy Concessions 
The first mediated model I test asks whether the value of the strategic policy 
concessions modifies the effect of NGO pressure on the probability a recipient gets 
foreign aid.  In this section, I test the hypothesis that donors are less likely to punish 
potential recipients who are close strategic allies.  These recipients are likely to be able to 
offer valuable policy concessions to the donor, for example access to military bases or 
fly-over rights.  The opportunity cost of punishing a strategic ally is higher than it is for 
punishing a non-aligned recipient.  Only if the potential recipient is not a strategic ally 
and there is Amnesty publicity, do I expect the donor to punish the potential recipient by 
withholding aid. I re-word Hypothesis 1 from the previous chapter to reflect this chapter’s 
dependent variable: 
Hypothesis 1a: Recipients are less likely to get aid as Amnesty News Releases 
increase, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the strategic 
importance of the recipient to the donor increases. 
  
I find support for the Mediation Hypothesis.  Once I account for the mediating 
effect of NGO pressure, the direct effect of human rights on foreign aid is zero.41 Column 
                                                
41 In the Appendix, I present the results of the mediation model without any modifying variables (Table A- 
1). The coefficient on AINR is negative and statistically significant, while the coefficient on human rights 
is indistinguishable from zero. .  The results suggest that Amnesty news releases do mediate the effect of 
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three of Table 5-1 presents the raw results from the probit analysis of Model 1a and 
shows that the direct effect of human rights is not statistically significant.  In addition, as 
shown in Table 5-2, a one-unit increase in violations from the mean has no effect on the 
predicted probability of receiving aid.  Comparing this result to the effect of human rights 
in the unmediated model provides evidence that NGO pressure mediates the effect of 
human rights on foreign aid.  Once I have controlled for the effect of Amnesty news 
releases, conditional on alignment, the direct effect of human rights reduces to zero.   
Figure 5-1: Marginal Effect of AINR on Aid as Alignment Changes 
 
 This model also shows that the effect of NGO pressure on foreign aid depends on 
the potential strategic value of policy concessions the donor may seek from the recipient, 
however this effect is in the opposite direction than I predicted in Hypothesis 1a. Figure 
5-1 illustrates the marginal effect of AI news releases as alignment changes.  The 
marginal effect is statistically significant and negative, which suggests that recipients 
                                                
human rights on the likelihood that a recipient receives foreign aid.  And that the effect of NGO attention is 
negative; countries whose human rights records are subject to NGO mobilization through news releases are 
less likely to receive aid.   
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subject to NGO mobilization are less likely to receive aid, however the conditioning 
effect of alignment is small.  Donors appear more likely to punish potential recipients by 
withholding aid when they are closely aligned. Again, these substantive effects are not 
very large, but they do provide some evidence that donors react to NGO mobilization. 
5.2.2 Salience of Economic Policy Concessions 
 In this section, I will test whether the salience of economic policy concessions 
modifies the effect of NGO pressure on foreign aid. The relevant hypotheses from the 
previous chapter are re-worded to account for the dependent variable in this chapter: 
Hypothesis 2a: Recipients are less likely to get aid as Amnesty News Releases 
increase, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the share of exports 
from the donor to recipient increases.  
 
Hypothesis 3a: Recipients are less likely to get aid as Amnesty News Releases 
increase, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the recipient’s 
petroleum exports increase. 
 
In this section, I capture the value of policy concessions the donor may wish to 
buy from the recipient in economic terms.  Namely, I expect that donors will be less 
likely to punish countries that are important export markets or significant petroleum 
exporters.  As with security alignment, these measures capture the potential salience of 
policy concessions and, therefore, what the donor could lose if it withholds aid.   
I present the probit results for models 2a and 3a in Table 5-3.42  In the model with 
export share as the salience variable, the mediating effect of NGO mobilization 
disappears.  In fact, the direct effect of human rights controlling for AI news releases 
modified by export share is greater than the total effect in the unmediated model and is 
statistically significant. Table 5-4 shows that the substantive effect of a one unit increase 
                                                
42 Due to data availability, the numbers of observations in the economic salience models are substantially 
lower than in the other models.  To make sure that these results are not an artifact of the smaller sample 
size, I re-estimated the unmediated model with the restricted sample to find that the results hold.   
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in human rights violations from the mean (3.6 to 4.6) reduces the probability of aid by 
0.6%, once I controlled for the NGO mobilization and its interaction with export share.  
Table 5-3: Probit, AINR Modified by Economic Salience 





Recipient Oil Exports 




Export Share, logged 2.478*** 
(0.600) 
-- 
AINR*Export Share -0.833 
(1.241) 
-- 
































































# of Observations 28, 283 31, 920 
R2 0.47 0.51 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1                                                                    Standard Errors in parentheses 
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 Table 5-4: Predicted Probabilities, AINR modified by Economic Salience 
 When Human 
Rights is at its 
Mean 
When Human 














    






    
Note: All other continuous variables held at their mean, dichotomous variables held at their mode 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 
 
 
Figure 5-2 illustrates that export share does not modify the effect of NGO 
pressure on the likelihood a country receives foreign aid.  Regardless of the level of 
export share, the marginal effect of Amnesty news releases is consistently negative.  This 
result is inconsistent with Hypothesis 2a, which expected that donors would be less likely 
to withhold aid from recipients that are key export markets for the donor regardless of 
NGO pressure.  Instead, donors consistently punish recipients who are subject to NGO 
mobilization regardless of the export relationship between the two countries. 




 I also use recipient petroleum exports as a proxy for the salience of economic 
policy concessions.  In this model, the direct effect of human rights on foreign aid is 
actually positive.  This implies that, once controlling for NGO pressure and its interaction 
with recipient oil exports, violators get more aid.  This result is only statistically 
significant at the 0.1 level and is substantively small (only a 0.5% increase after a one 
unit shift from the mean level of violations).   
Figure 5-3 illustrates the marginal effect of AI news releases on the probability a 
recipient receives foreign aid and the results are contrary to my expectations in 
Hypothesis 3a.  I predicted that donors would be less likely to withhold aid from high oil 
exporters, yet results show the opposite.  High oil exporters who are subject to NGO 
attention are less likely to receive aid and this result is statistically significant at high 
levels of oil exports.  




5.2.3 Other Measures of Policy Concession Salience 
 I also include Bueno de Mesquita and Smith’s (2009) measures of the potential 
value of policy concessions as alternate measures of salience.  These tests provide a 
useful complement to the other measures of salience I introduced by identifying 
characteristics of the recipient that makes policy concessions valuable.  According to 
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) donors will value policy concessions more from 
recipients who are geographically close, more populous, and/or former colonies than 
those who are not.  My argument follows, then, that donors will be less likely to punish 
these same recipients precisely because of the value the donor places on the policy 
concessions. The following three hypotheses reflect this argument:  
Hypothesis 4a: Recipients are less likely to receive aid as Amnesty News Releases 
increase, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the distance between 
the donor and recipient decreases.  
 
Hypothesis 5a: Recipients are less likely to receive aid as Amnesty News Releases 
increase, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the recipient’s 
population increases 
 
Hypothesis 6a: Recipients are less likely to get aid as Amnesty News Releases 
increase, but this relationship is less pronounced if the recipient is a former 
colony of the donor. 
 
Across these three models, the direct effect of human rights is indistinguishable 
from zero.  In Table 5-5, the coefficients on human rights are close to zero and not 
statistically significant.  Table 5-6 further shows that the change in predicted probability 
as human rights abuses increase one unit from the mean is zero for all three models.  This 
provides additional support for the hypothesis that NGO pressure mediates the effect of 






Table 5-5: Probit Results, AINR Modified by Other Salience 































Colony -- -- 0.754*** 
(0.064) 
AINR*Colony -- -- -0.039 
(0.162) 



















































































# of Observations 41, 834 41, 834 41, 834 
R2 0.45 0.45 0.45 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1                                                                                                            Standard Errors in parentheses 
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Table 5-6: Predicted Probabilities, AINR modified by Other Salience Variables 
 When Human 
Rights is at its 
Mean 
When Human Rights is at 1 




Predicted Probability of 
Receiving Aid (Model 4a) 
0.752 0.752 0.000 
    
Predicted Probability of 
Receiving Aid (Model 5a) 
0.751 0.751 0.000 
    
Predicted Probability of 
Receiving Aid (Model 6a) 
0.729 0.729 0.000 
    
Note: All other continuous variables held at their mean, dichotomous variables held at their mode 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 
 
Contrary to Hypothesis 5a, the recipient’s population has only a small conditional 
effect of the marginal effect of AI news releases.  As Figure 5-5 shows, regardless of 
population size, the probability of getting aid is reduced by about 5% for a one unit 
change in AI news releases.  Finally, the results for the modifying effect of historical 
colonial ties are as expected in Hypothesis 6a; recipients who are not former colonies of 
the donor are more likely to have aid withheld if they are subject to AI news releases 
(when colony is zero, the coefficient on AINR is negative and statistically significant).  A 
one unit increase in Amnesty news releases reduces by 4% the likelihood of receiving aid 
for a recipient that is not a former colony.  For a former colony, the marginal effect of 
Amnesty news releases is not statistically significant. 
Figure 5-4 illustrates the marginal effect of Amnesty news releases as the distance 
between the donor and recipient increases.  Consistent with Hypothesis 4a, donors are not 
likely to punish recipients who are geographically close to them even if they are the focus 
of Amnesty news releases.43  In fact, recipients are more likely to receive aid if they are 
geographically close and the subject of NGO mobilization than if they are not.  As the 
                                                
43 The range on the distance variable (natural log of distance between the capitals, in miles) is 4.18 to 9.4. 
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distance between the two countries increases, recipients are less likely to receive aid as 
Amnesty news releases increase.   
Contrary to Hypothesis 5a, the recipient’s population has only a small conditional 
effect of the marginal effect of AI news releases.  As Figure 5-5 shows, regardless of 
population size, the probability of getting aid is reduced by about 5% for a one unit 
change in AI news releases.  Finally, the results for the modifying effect of historical 
colonial ties are as expected in Hypothesis 6a; recipients who are not former colonies of 
the donor are more likely to have aid withheld if they are subject to AI news releases 
(when colony is zero, the coefficient on AINR is negative and statistically significant).  A 
one unit increase in Amnesty news releases reduces by 4% the likelihood of receiving aid 
for a recipient that is not a former colony.  For a former colony, the marginal effect of 
Amnesty news releases is not statistically significant. 






Figure 5-5: Marginal Effect of AINR as Recipient Population Changes 
 
5.3 Electoral Incentives 
 Finally, I test whether donors with larger district magnitudes are more vulnerable 
to NGO pressure and, consequently, whether they are more likely to withhold aid from 
violators who are subject to NGO mobilization.  In Chapter 3, I argued that promoting 
public goods qualifies as a national public good and that donors with high electoral 
permissiveness will be more likely to provide this good.  An auxiliary explanation is that 
the promotion of human rights is a niche interest.  I would expect, therefore, that donors 
with larger district magnitude systems - those that allow more for the representation of 
niche interests through a multi-party system - would be more likely to respond to NGO 
pressure to punish violators.  The marginal effect of Amnesty news releases should be 
strongest when the donor’s district magnitude is larger.  When the donor has a small 
district magnitude, the marginal effect of Amnesty news releases should be either be 
insignificant or small. 
Hypothesis 7a: Recipients are less likely to receive aid as Amnesty News releases 





Equation 7: Foreign Aid = β0 + β1AINR+ β2DM + β3AINR*DM + β4HR + 
β5RecipientGDP/Cap + β6lnDistance + β7lnRpop + β8Egypt + β9Israel + β10Colony + 
β11RecipientWinningCoalition + β12DonorWealth + β13-15Splines + ε 
 
Table 5-7: Probit Results, AINR Modified by District Magnitude 
 Model 7a 
Modifying Variable: District 
Magnitude 










Human Rights 0.001 
(0.004) 
R GDP/Cap, logged -0.189*** 
(0.009) 




















Spline 1 0.016*** 
(0.001) 
Spline 2 -0.029*** 
(0.001) 
Spline 3 0.024*** 
(0.001) 





# of Observations 40, 663 
R2 0.46 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 




Consistent with the hypothesis that NGO pressure mediates the effect of human 
rights on aid, the direct effect of human rights in Model 7a is essentially zero (Table 5-7). 
Table 5-8 also illustrates this result.   
 




is at its 
Mean 
When Human Rights is at 1 
standard deviation above its 
mean 
Change in Probability 
Predicted Probability of Receiving 







    
Note: All other continuous variables held at their mean, dichotomous variables held at their mode 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 
 
Contrary to Hypothesis 7a, donors with smaller district magnitudes are more 
likely to withhold aid to recipients who are subject to NGO mobilization.  Figure 5-6 
illustrates this relationship, showing that the marginal effect of AI news releases 
approaches zero as donor district magnitude increases.  The marginal effect of Amnesty 
news releases is consistently negative, implying that as NGOs publicize violations, 
countries are less likely to get aid.  This result weakens as the donor district magnitude 
increases.  The donors that are most likely to punish potential recipients are those with 








 In this chapter, I found some evidence that the effect of human rights on the 
probability a recipient receives foreign aid is mediated by NGO pressure.  As the number 
of Amnesty news releases highlighting human rights abuses in a particular country 
increase, the probability of that country receiving aid decreases under many conditions.  
The exceptions are when the donor seeks salient policy concessions from the potential 
recipient.  Only two of the measures for policy concession salience - distance and 
colonial status - behaved as I expected, modifying the effect of NGO pressure on foreign 
aid.  As the potential value of policy concessions increased because the recipient was 
geographically close to the donor or a former colony, the marginal effect of AI news 
releases became insignificant or, in the case of geographical distance, positive.  
Alignment also modified the effect of AI news releases, although the effect was small 
and in the opposite direction than predicted.  Donors were slightly more likely to 
withhold aid to recipients who were subject to NGO mobilization if they were closely 
 
 81 
aligned.  Similarly, donors were more likely to withhold aid to recipients subject to AI 
news releases if they were high oil exporters - also contrary to my predictions.  Finally, 
recipient population did not modify the effect of AI news releases.  The marginal effect 
of Amnesty news releases was negative and essentially unchanging as population 
increased.   
 The findings with respect to alignment, export share, recipient oil export, and 
recipient population all run counter to my hypotheses.  I expected that these measures of 
salience would eliminate the negative effect of NGO pressure on foreign aid.  This was 
not the case.  One possible reason for some of these findings is that in addition to 
capturing the value the donor places on policy concessions from the recipient, these 
variables may also capture the potential leverage that the donor has over the recipient.  
Donors may be more likely to punish recipients over whom they can exercise leverage, 
either as a security or trading partner, because they could arguably have more of an 
influence in these countries.  An important next step in this research agenda would be to 
parse out the effects of policy concession salience, on the one hand, and donor leverage 
over the recipient on the other. 
 With respect to the mediation hypotheses, many of the models presented support 
the argument that the effect of human rights on foreign aid is actually mediated through 
NGO pressure.  I argued in Chapter 3 that policymakers are more likely to punish 
violators when those violations are publicized.  These results provide some evidence to 
suggest that this is true.  Although not all models showed these results, in 5 of the 7 
models controlling for AI news releases conditional on salience or district magnitude, the 
direct effect of human rights was indistinguishable from zero.  The total effect of human 
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rights (shown in the Table 5-1 and Table 5-2 results for the unmediated model) is 
substantively very small, but consistent with the first step of testing a mediation effect, is 
statistically significant.  Since it is not statistically significant in most of the mediated 
models, this provides some support for the hypothesis that AI news releases mediate the 
effect of human rights on foreign aid and, in many cases, is conditional on the potential 
value of the policy concessions. 
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Chapter 6  
Decision-making at the Allocation Stage 
 
 The previous chapter explored the donor decision-making process at the gate-
keeping stage, when donors decide whether to give aid to particular recipients.  In this 
chapter, I examine the donor’s decision at the allocation stage: given that a country 
receives aid, how much does it get?44  As I discussed in Chapter 4, the dependent variable 
of interest is the share of total donor aid a particular recipient receives.  This best captures 
the question of aid allocation from the donor perspective.  The donor has a budget for 
foreign aid and must allocate it among various recipients.  If we find that human rights 
matter, then donors should allocate a smaller share to recipients who violate human rights 
and, more specifically, who are subject to NGO mobilization but are not of strategic or 
economic value to the donor.   
6.1 Unmediated Model 
 First, I test the total effect of human rights on the share of foreign aid, without the 
mediating and modifying variables.  This model will provide the baseline by which I will 
compare the mediated models. 45  
Equation 8:  Foreign Aid = β0 + β1HR + β2RecipientGDP/Cap + β3lnDistance + 
β4lnRpop + β5Egypt + β6Israel + β7Colony + β8RecipientWinningCoalition + 
+β9LaggedDV + ε  
 
                                                
44 The sample in this chapter is a subset of the sample in Chapter 5.  Only countries that receive aid - or 
passed the gate-keeping stage - are included. 
45 As I laid out in Chapter 4, I use donor fixed effects and include a lagged dependent variable to account 
for the problems associated with non-independent observations.  For all the models in this chapter, I test for 
robustness using ordinarly least squares regression with robust standard errors and the results are similar.  I 
also test for robustness using the natural log of total aid as the dependent variable and the results are robust.  
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Table 6-1: Share of Foreign Aid 
 Unmediated Model Model 1b: 
Modifying Variable: Alignment 
AINR, logged -- -0.025** 
(0.010) 
Alignment, logged -- -0.047 
(0.057) 
AINR*Alignment -- 0.120** 
(0.056) 














































   
# of Observations 27, 987 26, 620 
R2 0.78 0.78 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 




The second column in Table 6-1 presents the results of the unmediated model, 
which show that human rights abuses are associated with a decrease the share of aid a 
recipient receives.  The substantive effect, however, is very small.  A one-unit increase in 
human rights violations decreases the share of aid a recipient receives by less than one 
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percent.46  Most other variables in this model behave as expected.  Donors give a greater 
share of aid to recipients who are closer and more populous.  More aid is also given to 
former colonies, as well as to recipients with large winning coalitions.  This latter point 
could be explained in two ways. First, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) argued that 
more aid needs to be given to leaders with larger winning coalitions so that leaders can 
provide their winning coalition with private benefits to offset the unpopularity of the 
policy concession.  Other scholars (Boulding and Hyde n.d.) argue that donors reward 
democratic institutions with more aid.  Not surprisingly, the lagged dependent variable is 
statistically significant and relatively large.  Foreign aid appears to produce its own 
inertia, where aid from the previous period largely explains aid in the next.47  Finally, one 
result runs contrary to expectations.  Much of the existing literature (Bueno de Mesquita 
and Smith 2009; Alesina and Dollar 2000) bemoans the common finding that aid does not 
consistently flow to needy recipients.  These results show that recipients with higher GDP 
per capita get smaller shares of aid.  In other words, donors do seem to provide aid to 
needy recipients.48   
6.2 The Salience of Policy Concessions 
 
The unmediated model suggests that there is, however small, a negative total 
effect of human rights conditions on the share of aid a recipient receives.  In this section, 
                                                
46 Since the dependent variable is logged and the independent variable of interest, human rights, is a level, I 
interpret the coefficient as the percent change in the dependent variable (share aid) for a one-unit increase 
in the independent variable, here human rights.  Holding the other independent variables at their means (or 
modes for the dichotomous variables), the share of aid at the mean level of human rights is 0.002328 and 
drops to 0.002314 when human rights violations increase by one unit.   
47 The correlation between share of aid in time t with share of aid in t-1 is .89 and statistically significant. 
48 As discussed in Chapter 5, one reason for this different finding may be the exact sample used.  Alesina 
and Dollar (2000) use as their dependent variable a 5 year average of bilateral aid flows from 1970-1994.  
They present a positive correlation between aid per capita and recipient income (measured as real 
GDP/capita). In my sample from 1980-2000, I find a negative correlation between recipient GDP/capita 
and share of aid received.   
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I will test a series of hypotheses to see if this effect is mediated by NGO pressure.  I 
expect that at least part of the causal story linking a recipient’s human rights conditions 
and the share of aid it receives rests with the role of NGOs in publicizing abuses.  At the 
same time, I argue that the effect of NGO mobilization on foreign aid is modified by the 
value the donor places on policy concessions from the recipient.  If donors use foreign aid 
to purchase policy concessions from recipients, then cutting aid may limit the 
concessions the recipient is willing to provide to the donor.  As the value of the 
concessions increases, I would expect the donors would be less willing to risk losing the 
concession. This leads to the following general hypothesis: 
General Hypothesis: Recipients will receive a smaller share of donor aid as 
Amnesty International News Releases increase, but this relationship becomes less 
pronounced as the value of the policy concessions the donor seeks increases.  
 
In the sections that follow, I test this general hypothesis with each measure of policy 
concessions salience.  Equation 9 presents the model I will use in each section.  As I 
discussed in Chapter 4, I include a lagged dependent variable and I use donor fixed 
effects in these models to account for the non-independence of observations. 
Equation 9: Foreign Aid = β0 + β1AINR+ β2Alignment + β3AINR*Alignment + β4HR + 
β5RecipientGDP/Cap + β6lnDistance + β7lnRpop + β8Egypt + β9Israel + β10Colony + 
β11RecipientWinningCoalition + β12DonorWealth + β13LaggdedDV+ ε  
 
In each section that follows, I also compare the total effect of human rights in the 
unmediated model to the direct effect in the mediated models.  If Amnesty news releases 
mediate the effect of human rights on aid, conditional on the salience of the policy 
concession, then I expect the coefficient on human rights to approach zero in these 
models.   




6.2.1 The Effect of the Salience of Strategic Policy Concessions 
First, I test whether the salience of strategic policy concessions modifies the 
mediating effect of NGO pressure on the share of foreign aid a country receives.  
Specifically, I test the interactive hypothesis that donors are less likely to punish potential 
recipients who are close strategic allies, even if they are subject to NGO mobilization.  
Hypothesis 1b: Recipients will receive a smaller share of donor aid as Amnesty 
News releases increase, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the 
strategic importance of the recipient to the donor increases. 
 
In column three of Table 6-1, I present the results of this model.49  The coefficient 
on human rights is not statistically significant, providing some support for the hypothesis 
that its effect is mediated through NGO pressure.  In addition, I find some support for 
Hypothesis 1b, that the effect of NGO pressure on aid is modified by the security 
relationship between the donor and recipient. Figure 6-1 shows the substantive 
interpretation of the interactive terms.   
Figure 6-1: Marginal Effect of NGO Mobilization, Modified by Alignment 
 
                                                
49 In the appendix, I present the results of the mediation model without modifying terms (Table 
A-2).  The coefficient on AINR is negative and statistically significant, demonstrating that 
recipients receive less aid as the number of Amnesty news releases focusing on their human 
rights conditions increase.  Also, the coefficient on human rights is insignificant, supporting my 
argument that the effect of human rights on aid is mediated through Amnesty attention. 
 
 88 
There is support for my hypothesis that donors are more likely to punish 
recipients who are not close strategic allies as the number of Amnesty news releases 
increase.  The marginal effect of AI news releases is negative and statistically significant 
for recipients who are strategically distant from the donor.  For recipients who are share 
few security ties (alignment is one standard deviation below the mean) with the donor, a 
one percent increase in Amnesty news releases reduces aid by about 4.5%.50  For 
recipients at the mean alignment with the donor, a one percent increase in Amnesty news 
releases reduces aid by just below 3%.  As expected, those recipients that have strong 
security ties to the donor (anything above a tau score of zero), there is no statistically 
significant reduction in share of aid.  This is consistent with my hypothesis that donors 
who seek strategically valuable policy concessions from close allies will be unlikely to 
punish these recipients even in the face of NGO mobilization. The results with respect to 
the control variables are consistent with the unmediated model presented in the previous 
section. 
6.2.2 Effect of the Salience of Economic Concessions 
 Next, I examine how the salience of economic policy concessions conditions the 
effect of NGO mobilization on foreign aid.  In particular, I ask whether donors give less 
aid to recipients who are the focus of AI news releases only if they are not important 
                                                
50 The remaining independent variables of interest are all in natural log form. Therefore, these coefficients 
would be interpreted as elasticities.  In other words, a one percent increase in the independent variable 
corresponds to a percent increase in the dependent variable of the value of the coefficient.  Because the 
remaining models are all interactive, the coefficient on AINR, by itself, only indicates the effect of AINR 
when the corresponding salience variable equals zero.  Instead I interpret the conditional coefficient on 
AINR as β1+ β3Salience.  In other words, a one percent increase in AINR corresponds to a (β1 + 
β3Salience) percent increase in share of aid, rather than a β1 since the effect of AINR on foreign aid 
depends on salience.   
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export markets for the donor or high petroleum exporters themselves.  The relevant 
hypotheses are: 
Hypothesis 2b: Recipients will receive a smaller share of donor aid as Amnesty 
News releases increase, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the 
share of exports from the donor to recipient increases. 
 
Hypothesis 3b Recipients will receive a smaller share of donor aid as Amnesty 
News releases increase, but this relationship becomes less pronounced as the 
recipient’s petroleum exports increase. 
 
Like Hypothesis 1b above, these hypotheses reflect the conditional nature of NGO 
mobilization and the value of economic policy concessions.  In addition, I still compare 
the direct effect of human rights in these models to the total effect in the unmediated 
model, in Table 6-1, to explore whether Amnesty news releases mediate the effect of 
human rights on foreign aid, the Mediation Hypothesis.  
The results again indicate that the effect of human rights is mediated, as the 
coefficient on human rights in both models is indistinguishable from zero (Table 6-2).  
As illustrated in Figure 6-2, export share does not modify the effect of AI news releases 
as predicted by Hypothesis 2b.51  The effect of export share when there are no Amnesty 
news releases is positive and statistically significant, indicating that important export 
markets do get a greater share of aid.  In this model, Israel also receives a greater share of 
aid even after controlling for these other factors.  The effect of the recipient’s winning 




                                                
51 When export share is zero - i.e. the donor does not export anything to the recipient - the marginal effect 




Table 6-2: Human Rights Mediated by AINR: Modified by Economic Salience 
 Model 2b 
Modifying Variable: Export 
Share 
Model 3b 
Modifying Variable: Recipient 
Oil Exports 




































































   
# of Observations 19, 102 21, 658 
R2 0.77 0.78 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 





Figure 6-2: Marginal Effect of NGO Mobilization, Modified by Export Share 
 
 
 I also hypothesized that a recipient’s petroleum exports would modify the effect 
of Amnesty news releases, as donors would want to maintain access to petroleum 
resources.  The results support Hypothesis 3b.  Donors give a smaller share of aid to 
recipients who are subject to Amnesty news releases, but only if they are not significant 
oil exports (Figure 6-3). The median value for this independent variable is close to 0.  As 
Figure 6-3 illustrates, the marginal effect of NGO pressure is negative and statistically 
significant for all recipients with oil exports below the median. In this model, unlike the 
export share model, nearly all the other control variables behave as in the unmediated 
model.  The only exception is that the dummy variable for Egypt is statistically 
significant in this model, suggesting that Egypt is likely to get a greater share of aid, once 
I control for recipient oil exports. 
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Figure 6-3: Marginal Effect of NGO Mobilization, Modified by Recipient Oil Exports 
 
6.2.3 Other Measures of Policy Concession Salience 
 In this section, I test the modifying effects of distance, recipient population, and 
colony on the effect of Amnesty news releases on foreign aid.  These variables are 
additional proxies for the salience of potential policy concessions from the recipient.  The 
hypotheses tested in this section are: 
Hypothesis 4b: Recipients will receive a smaller share of donor aid as Amnesty 
News releases increase, and this effect will be more pronounced as geographical 
distance between the donor and recipient increases. 
 
Hypothesis 5b: Recipients will receive a smaller share of donor aid as Amnesty 
News releases increase, and this effect will be less pronounced as the recipient’s 
population increases.   
 
Hypothesis 6b: Recipients will receive a smaller share of donor aid as Amnesty 
News releases increase, but this relationship is less pronounced if the recipient is 








Table 6-3: Human Rights Mediated by AINR: Modified by Other Salience Variables 


























AINR*R Population --  -- 
Colony -- -- 0.410*** 
(0.037) 
AINR*Colony -- -- -0.053 
(0.043) 

























































    
# of Observations 27, 497 27, 497 27, 497 
R2 0.78 0.78 0.78 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 




With respect to these measures of the potential salience of policy concessions - 
distance, recipient population, and colonial status - there is additional evidence that NGO 
mobilization mediates the effect of human rights on foreign aid and, further, that this 
effect is conditional on the potential value of the policy concession.  In each of these 
models, the direct effect of human rights is indistinguishable from zero (see Table 6-3).52  
The modifying effect of distance is as predicted; recipients who are further away from the 
donor are more likely to be punished - by receiving a smaller share of aid - than closer 
recipients.  As illustrated in Figure 6-4, a one percent increase in Amnesty news releases 
corresponds to a 3.4% decrease in share of aid received by the recipient when it is far 
from the donor (distance is one standard deviation above the mean).  
 





                                                
52 At the same time, the marginal effect of AINR is not significant across a wide range of distance or 
population values.  This implies that the modifying variables of distance and population are responsible for 
much of the causal story. 
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The modifying effect of recipient population is relatively flat, as seen in Figure 6-5, but is 
statistically significant for medium levels of recipient population.  For these recipients, a 
one percent increase in Amnesty news releases reduces the recipient’s share of aid by 
2.3%.  Finally, the conditional effect of former colonial status is contrary to the 
expectations in Hypothesis 6b.  The marginal effect of Amnesty news releases is negative 
and statistically significant whether the recipient was a colony of the donor, but the 
marginal effect is higher for former colonies (7.4% compared to 2.1%).  
 
Figure 6-5: Marginal Effect of NGO Mobilization, Modified by Recipient Population 
 
6.3 The Effect of Political Institutions 
 Finally, I test whether donor political institutions influence how responsive 
donors are to NGO pressure.   I expect that donors with larger district magnitudes will be 
more likely to punish recipients who are subject to AI news releases.   I argued in Chapter 
3 that the promotion of human rights abroad is largely a national public good and, 
therefore, I expect systems that emphasize the allocation of national public goods - over 
regional ones - would be more likely to punish human rights violators who are subject to 
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NGO mobilization.  Further, anecdotally, Green parties have heralded human rights as a 
foreign policy objective.  I expect systems with larger district magnitudes, which 
encourage the formation of multi-party systems, to be more likely to incorporate human 
rights into foreign aid decision-making.  This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 7b: Recipients will receive a smaller share of donor aid as Amnesty 
News releases increase, and this effect will be more pronounced as the donor’s 
district magnitude increases. 
 
Table 6-4: Human Rights Mediated by AINR: Modified by Donor District Magnitude 
 Model 7b 
Modifying Variable: Donor 
District Magnitude 
AINR, logged -0.026* 
(0.015) 






Human Rights -0.003 
(0.003) 




















# of Observations 25, 981 
R2 0.78 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 





In Table 6-4, I present the initial results of the following model, which includes 
the interactive term for Amnesty news releases and district magnitude: 
Equation 10: Foreign Aid = β0 + β1AINR+ β2DM + β3AINR*DM + β4HR + 
β5RecipientGDP/Cap + β6lnDistance + β7lnRpop + β8Egypt + β9Israel + β10Colony + 
β11RecipientWinningCoalition + β12LaggedDV + ε 
 
The direct effect of human rights continues to be not statistically significant, as it 
was in the previous mediated models.  Again, this provides at least some support for my 
hypothesis that the effect of human rights is mediated by NGO pressure.  The modifying 
effect of donor district magnitude runs counter to my expectation.  In fact, small district 
magnitude donors appear more likely to punish recipients by giving a smaller share of 
aid.  The marginal effect of Amnesty news releases on foreign aid is negative and 
statistically significant for donors with logged district magnitudes less than about 2.5.  
These donors give about 2.5% less aid to recipients for a one percent increase in Amnesty 
news releases (Figure 6-6).   
 





Although the total effect of human rights in the mediated model is very small, it is 
statistically significant.  In the mediated models, the direct effect of human rights was 
consistently not statistically significant.  This provides, at least some evidence, that the 
effect of human rights is mediated through NGO pressure.  This suggests that, rather than 
responding to the actual human rights conditions in recipient countries, policymakers act 
when there is NGO pressure to do so.  One important step for future research is to 
develop additional measures of NGO pressure.  Although Amnesty International is a 
trustworthy and reliable NGO, it still operates under strategic constraints and limited 
resources (Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers 2005).  To further its mission, it requires resources 
and visibility, which sometimes means reporting on states with higher visibility - namely 
richer and more powerful states - and paying less attention to other violators.  A more 
comprehensive measure of NGO pressure is, therefore, one important step for future 
work. 
The other set of findings in this chapter shows that NGO pressure appears to be 
conditional on the potential importance of the recipient in terms of the value of policy 
concessions.  Although this is not true for all measures of salience I employed in this 
chapter, I do find that donors are less likely to punish recipients who have potential 
strategic value, as measured by security alignment.  Donors also give a smaller share of 
aid to recipients who are subject to NGO mobilization provided they are not significant 
oil exporters. The measures of salience that Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) employ 
- distance, recipient population, and colony - all appear to modify the effect of Amnesty 
news releases on foreign aid, although not always in the direction I predicted.  Donors are 
less likely to punish recipients who are geographically close, as predicted.  However, 
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donors are also less likely to punish recipients with smaller populations and those that are 
not former colonies, two results that run counter to my expectations.  Bueno de Mesquita 
and Smith (2009) argue that former colonies and recipients with larger populations are 
more salient to donors; I would expect, therefore, that donors would be least likely to 
punish recipients with these characteristics.  My results did not support this; instead 
donors are more likely to punish medium and large population recipients and former 
colonies.   
One possible explanation for these findings is that some of these measures of 
salience also proxy for the leverage that a donors has in a recipient country.  Donors may 
actually be more likely to punish recipients with whom they have closer ties because the 
donor feels that its efforts may be more successful in countries with which it has a 
stronger relationship.  Another important step for future research is to identify a way to 
parse out these various effects: salience and leverage.   
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Chapter 7  
Conclusion 
7.1 What is the role of Human Rights in Foreign Aid? 
This dissertation asked, under what conditions do donors condition foreign aid 
decisions on human rights conditions in the recipient country?  Most literature on foreign 
aid finds that donors tend to focus on “donor interest” factors in making aid decisions, 
with the objective of advancing economic and strategic foreign policy goals.  My 
objective in this dissertation was to build upon this existing literature and identify the 
conditions under which donors incorporate the promotion of human rights abroad into 
their broader foreign aid agenda.  I argued that donors are most likely to punish human 
rights violators when the opportunity cost of doing so is low and NGOs have mobilized 
to create an incentive for policymakers to act.  The opportunity cost of acting will be low, 
I argued, when donors do not seek salient policy concessions from the recipient.  For 
example, when there are few security and economic ties between the donor and recipient, 
the donor is more likely to punish a recipient whose human rights record has been 
attacked by an NGO.  In addition, I presented an argument that political institutions 
matter.  In particular, electoral rules that encourage the representation of niche interests 
and allocation of national public goods will be more likely to incorporate human rights 
into foreign policy objectives.   
7.2 Findings and Contributions to the Literature 
 One important contribution of this dissertation is a theoretically developed 
explanation for the role of NGOs.  Existing literature (c.f. Gillies 1996; Barratt 2008) 
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recognizes that NGOs play a role in human rights foreign policy, but does not provide a 
detailed theoretical rationale for the causal process.  I provide a comprehensive 
discussion of both how and under what conditions NGOs influence policymakers to 
respond to human rights abuses.  First, I argued that NGO pressure acts in a mediating 
role and that policymakers, rather than responding directly to human rights abuses, 
respond when NGOs shine a light on abuses.  Although the relationships are not strong, 
the empirical results do provide preliminary support that Amnesty International (AI) 
news releases mediate the effect of human rights on foreign aid, both at the gate-keeping 
and allocation stages.  Once I account for the mediating role of Amnesty news releases, 
the direct effect of the human rights score in the recipient country is no longer significant 
in most of the models I present.  The causal story linking human rights conditions to 
foreign aid, therefore, depends on the mobilization efforts of Amnesty International.  The 
reason for this, I argue, is that leaders act primarily to avoid the appearance of complicity 
with violators.  By publicizing abuses, Amnesty International activates the “mobilization 
of shame” and, under certain conditions, lead to donors taking action.   
 The second component of the role of NGO pressure is the conditions under which 
I expect it to matter.  In Chapter 3, I began with a more general discussion of foreign aid 
in order to place human rights as a foreign policy goal in a broader context.  I then 
consider the conditions under which I expect states to incorporate human rights into 
foreign aid decision-making.   Although the existing literature recognizes the relevance of 
donor interest variables in foreign aid giving, I argue that the importance of the strategic 
and economic relationship between the donor and recipient conditions NGO pressure and 
that this relationship is best conceptualized as an interactive one.  In particular, I argue 
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that the effect of NGO pressure on foreign aid is conditioned by the strategic and 
economic value of policy concessions the donor seeks from the recipient.  When policy 
concessions are very valuable to the donor, even strong NGO pressure is unlikely to 
offset the opportunity costs of punishing human rights violators.  Because the salience of 
policy concessions is a difficult concept to measure, I employ six different proxies to 
capture the value of policy concessions.  In Chapter 3, I hypothesize that three measures - 
alignment, donor export share, and recipient petroleum exports - will condition the effect 
of AI news releases.  I also include three measures of salience introduced by Bueno de 
Mesquita and Smith (2009): geographical distance between recipient and donor, recipient 
population, and former colonial status.   
Overall, I find that donors do react when Amnesty International draws attention to 
human rights abuses.  The marginal effect of AI news releases on foreign aid is negative 
at both the gate-keeping and allocation stages in most of the models tested in this 
dissertation. Even in some instances that I did not expect, the marginal effect of Amnesty 
news releases on foreign aid is negative.  For example, I expected close strategic allies to 
receive aid even if their rights abuses were highlighted by Amnesty International 
(Hypothesis 1a).  In fact, the opposite was true; strategic allies were less likely to receive 
aid as Amnesty news releases increases compared to countries not closely aligned with 
the donor.  Similarly, I expected high petroleum-exporting countries to continue to 
receive aid even under NGO scrutiny (Hypothesis 3a).  Instead, it was precisely these 
countries that were less likely to receive aid as the number of Amnesty news releases 
increased.    
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Amnesty news releases no longer have an effect on the likelihood a country 
receives aid under two conditions:  when the recipient is geographically close to the 
donor (Hypothesis 4a) or is a former colony of the donor (Hypothesis 6a). At the 
allocation level, Amnesty news releases no longer reduce the share of aid a recipient 
receives if the recipient is a close strategic ally of the donor (Hypothesis 1b), is a 
significant oil exporter (Hypothesis 3b), or is geographically close (Hypothesis 4b). 
Under these conditions, the opportunity cost of forgoing a policy concession is too high.  
These findings were consistent with my theoretical expectations.   
7.3 Gate-keeping versus Allocation Decision-Making 
A puzzle arises from my empirical findings when I compare the results of the two 
dependent variables.  Many of the modifying variables have different effects at the gate-
keeping stage than the allocation stage.  This suggests that there are certain causal 
mechanisms at work at the selection stage.  Once a recipient has been selected, however, 
different causal mechanisms tell the story at the allocation stage.   
Table 7-1: Table of Results 
 Gate-keeping Stage 
DV: Any Aid 
Allocation Stage 
DV: Share of Aid 
Mediation Hypothesis Mostly supported (6 of 7 models) Supported 
   
Hypothesis 1 (Alignment) Not supported Supported 
   
Hypothesis 2 (Export Share) Not supported Not supported 
   
Hypothesis 3 
(Recipient Oil Export) 
Not supported Supported 




   
Hypothesis 5 
(Recipient Population) 
Not supported Not supported 
   
Hypothesis 6 
(Former Colony) 
Supported Not supported 
   
Hypothesis 7 
(Donor DM) 




In Table 7-1, I briefly list the results of my hypotheses.  In three cases - export 
share, distance, and population - were the results for the modifying variables for policy 
concession salience consistent across the two dependent variables.  In the remaining 
models, the results point in opposite directions at the gate-keeping and allocation stages.  
First, I hypothesized that donors with security ties to recipients would be less likely to 
punish them.  This seems to hold at the allocation stage; donors give less aid to recipients 
who are subject to Amnesty news releases only if they are not strategic allies.  At the 
gate-keeping stage, however, this relationship is reversed.  Donors are less likely to give 
aid to countries subject to Amnesty news releases when they are strategic allies.  The 
same pattern emerged with respect to recipient oil exports.  I predicted that donors would 
be unlikely to punish recipients who are significant petroleum exporters.  This is only 
true at the allocation stage.   
On the other hand, one modifying variable exhibits the opposite pattern.  The 
hypothesis for colonial status is supported at the gate-keeping stage, but not supported at 
the allocation stage.  I expected that donors would be less likely to punish former 
colonies even if they are subject to Amnesty news releases.  I did find that former 
colonies are less likely to receive aid as Amnesty news releases increase.  The negative 
marginal effect of Amnesty news releases on the amount of aid former colonies receive is 
higher than it is for recipients who are not former colonies, suggesting that former 
colonies are punished at the allocation stage more than non-former colonies.  
One possible explanation for the opposing findings may rest with the opportunity 
cost associated with the two different punishments.  If foreign aid is used to buy policy 
concessions, then withholding aid entirely means that the donor loses access to the policy 
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concession.  On the other hand, allocating a smaller share of aid may simply mean the 
donor is purchasing a less valuable policy concession.53  Withholding aid at the gate-
keeping stage is a harder-line stance than allocating a smaller share of aid and, 
consequently, has a higher opportunity cost associated with it.  The results, therefore, 
may suggest that donors put different weights on the various types of policy concessions 
at the two decision-making stages. 
A related explanation, one that I discuss in the Future Research section below, is 
that some of these variables may be measuring the leverage that a donor has over a 
recipient.  For example, donors may punish strategic allies by withholding aid because 
the donor perceives that the potential effectiveness is higher than the same punishment 
towards a country with whom it is not strategically tied.  However, once the decision to 
give aid has been made, the donor will be less likely to punish strategic allies to avoid the 
opportunity cost in terms of policy concessions.  As I discuss below, an important next 
step is to parse out the effects of these measures to distinguish between characteristics 
that increase the donor’s leverage over the recipient from those that increase the salience 
of policy concessions for the donor.   
 
 
                                                
53 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) use the example of the United States attempting to buy a policy 
concession from Turkey to help prosecute the war in Iraq.  The U.S. may have ultimately preferred to have 
access to bases in Turkey, but this was a policy concession Turkey was not willing to give (because it was 
too costly domestically for Turkey).  The U.S. still used foreign aid to buy a policy concession - ability to 
rescue downed pilots out of NATO bases in Turkey - because it was cheaper.  This example illustrates how 
donors can essentially select from a range of policy concessions that fit (a) what the donor is willing to 
spend and (b) what the recipient is willing to sell.  Therefore, a donor may punish a human rights violator 
by giving it less aid, but the opportunity cost is that the donor is buying a less valuable policy concession 
than it would have otherwise.  Although this is certainly an opportunity cost, it is a smaller cost than getting 
no policy concession.   
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7.4 Future Research 
 
The findings in this dissertation suggest that human rights do influence foreign 
aid, although perhaps not in the way expected by other scholars.  One reason for the 
inconsistent existing empirical findings may be because scholars have missed the 
mediating role that NGOs play. If it is true that policymakers respond more when 
violations are publicized through NGOs, then simply looking at human rights conditions 
misses this important causal story.  With future research, I would want to produce a more 
comprehensive measure for NGO pressure that mitigates the selection problems inherent 
in the Amnesty measure.  This would provide an additional test for the mediation 
hypothesis.  Since state power is a significant determinant of Amnesty news releases 
(Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers 2005), this may confound the results.  The exact countries that 
Amnesty is reporting on are the same that donors may be reluctant to punish because of 
economic or strategic ties.  A more comprehensive measure that takes into account other 
NGO activity or other forms of pressure may produce different results.      
It will also be important to parse out the potentially confounding effects of my 
measures of policy concession value.  I chose these measures as ones that capture the 
value a donor places on its relationship with the recipient, either in a strategic or 
economic sense.  It is possible, however, that these same measures also depict the 
influence a donor has over a particular recipient.  For example, on the one hand, security 
alignment may serve as a proxy for strategic policy concessions - such as flyover rights 
or access to bases - a donor may purchase from a recipient.  At the same time, however, a 
donor may also interpret this same relationship to suggest that it can influence the 
recipient to change it human rights behavior.  In the latter case, I might expect donors to 
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be more likely to punish recipients who are strategically close.  The same could be true 
for measures of economic ties.  A critical piece of future research would require parsing 
out these two competing effects to identify measures that more succinctly capture the 
value of the policy concessions to the donor.  As I discussed in the previous section, this 
may also have important implications for the causal mechanisms at different stages of 
decision-making. 
Another important step for future work is to conduct donor-by-donor analyses.  
This set of analyses is important to examine whether donors react differently to human 
rights violations, conditional on the salience of policy concessions.  For example, much 
of the literature on human rights and foreign aid expect the Nordic countries to place a 
greater premium on human rights (c.f. Olsen 1998; Gates & Hoeffler 2004).  Many also 
assume that the United States, as a superpower, approaches foreign aid differently (c.f. 
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009). 
Finally, my results with respect to political institutions failed to support either the 
gate-keeping hypothesis (Hypothesis 7a) or the allocation hypothesis (Hypothesis 7b).  
Donors with larger district magnitudes were actually less likely to withhold aid to 
countries who where subject to Amnesty publicity (contrary to Hypothesis 7a).  District 
magnitude did not have much of an impact on the marginal effect of Amnesty news 
releases on the share of aid a recipient received.  The small effect that was present also 
ran counter to my hypothesis (Hypothesis 7b); donors with small district magnitudes gave 
less aid to recipients as the number of Amnesty news releases increased.  Although I 
believe that incorporating a discussion of political institutions is an important 
contribution of this dissertation, future research needs to reconsider the role of political 
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institutions.  One alternative approach is to use the concept of veto players.  Foreign aid 
policy tends to persist: whether aid was given in a previous year and previous levels of 
aid largely determine aid in the following year.54  Changes to foreign aid policy, 
therefore, require a change to the status quo.  The underlying principle of the veto players 
theory is that as the number of veto players - those actors who must agree to a policy 
change - increases, the status quo becomes more stable (Tsebelis 2002).  Future research 
could address this alternative political institutions argument: are donors with fewer veto 
players more likely to punish human rights violators as NGO pressure increases?   
7.5 Conclusion 
I began this dissertation asking under what conditions do donors punish human 
rights violators by withholding or restricting foreign aid.  Although the substantive 
influence of human rights may be small relative to other foreign policy goals, there is 
evidence that human rights do have an impact on foreign aid decision-making through 
NGO mobilization.  The preliminary finding that NGO pressure matters is important not 
only as a theoretical explanation, but also as a practical finding for those seeking to 
influence foreign aid policy.  The findings of this dissertation help to understand how and 
when NGO pressure can influence foreign aid decision-making.  Advocates for human 
rights may be better able to harness the power of NGOs to pressure donors to punish 
human rights violators.   
  
 
                                                
54 The correlation between AnyAidt-1 and AnyAidt is 0.81 and the correlation between ShareAidt-1 and 




Table A- 1: Mediated Model, Without Modifying Variables 
 DV: Any Aid 
Mediated Model 
AINR, logged -0.221*** 
(0.018) 
Human Rights -0.001 
(0.004) 
R GDP/Cap, logged -0.199*** 
(0.009) 




















Spline 1 0.017*** 
(0.001) 
Spline 2 -0.029*** 
(0.001) 
Spline 3 0.024*** 
(0.001) 





# of Observations 41, 834 
R2 0.45 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 






Table A- 2: Mediated Model, Without Modifying Variables 
 DV: Share of Aid 
Mediated Model 
AINR, logged -0.023** 
(0.009) 
Human Rights -0.004 
(0.003) 
R GDP/Cap, logged -0.108*** 
(0.007) 





















# of Observations 27, 497 
R2 0.78 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 
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